Blurry vision: institutional impediments to reform in Saudi Arabia by Spitler, Russell H.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items
2017-09
Blurry vision: institutional impediments to
reform in Saudi Arabia
Spitler, Russell H.
Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/56180
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.
Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun













Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.  
BLURRY VISION: INSTITUTIONAL IMPEDIMENTS TO 








Thesis Advisor:  Robert Looney 
Second Reader: Naazneen Barma 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB  
No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection 
of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including 
suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 
Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork 
Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY 
(Leave blank) 
2. REPORT DATE   
September 2017 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE   
BLURRY VISION: INSTITUTIONAL IMPEDIMENTS TO REFORM IN 
SAUDI ARABIA 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
 
6. AUTHOR(S) Russell H. Spitler 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING 
ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND 
ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING / 
MONITORING AGENCY 
REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB number ____N/A____. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.  
 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
In April 2016, the Saudi Arabian government announced Vision 2030, a highly ambitious reform 
program designed to move the country away from its reliance on oil revenues and to liberalize its 
conservative social dynamics. Despite the monarchy’s autocratic power, the kingdom has largely failed to 
employ citizens in the private sector, diversify its industries beyond hydrocarbon-related activity, and 
privatize the key drivers of its economy since adopting these goals in 1970. The majority of the population 
is under the age of 30, unemployment is high, and international energy markets are changing, so the 
country’s leadership needs to make changes that provide opportunity for the people and make the economy 
more sustainable. 
This thesis examines why the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia struggles to implement economic and social 
reform. By analyzing interconnected political, economic, and social causes that manifest in the structure of 
the state and society, the resource curse, and market inefficiencies, we show that the ultimate barrier to 
reform is the kingdom’s political dynamics. Without improvements to governance and modifications to the 
country’s patronage policies, economic change will be limited at best. Elites’ preferences for blocking 
political reform has hampered achievement of economic goals and will continue to prove problematic if 
not rescinded. 
14. SUBJECT TERMS  
Saudi Arabia, Vision 2030, NTP, FBP, economic reform, social reform, political reform, 
political economy, institutions, resource curse, rent seeking, corruption, oil, oil curse, rentier 
state, patronage, subsidies, volatility, Saudization, privatization, diversification, monarchy, 
economic growth, development, unemployment, human capital, youth bulge, Wahhabi, 
education 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
127 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 ii 




Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.  
 
 




Russell H. Spitler 
Lieutenant, United States Navy 
B.A., The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2009 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES 






















Chair, Department of National Security Affairs 
 iv 




In April 2016, the Saudi Arabian government announced Vision 2030, a highly 
ambitious reform program designed to move the country away from its reliance on oil 
revenues and to liberalize its conservative social dynamics. Despite the monarchy’s 
autocratic power, the kingdom has largely failed to employ citizens in the private sector, 
diversify its industries beyond hydrocarbon-related activity, and privatize the key drivers 
of its economy since adopting these goals in 1970. The majority of the population is 
under the age of 30, unemployment is high, and international energy markets are 
changing, so the country’s leadership needs to make changes that provide opportunity for 
the people and make the economy more sustainable. 
This thesis examines why the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia struggles to implement 
economic and social reform. By analyzing interconnected political, economic, and social 
causes that manifest in the structure of the state and society, the resource curse, and 
market inefficiencies, we show that the ultimate barrier to reform is the kingdom’s 
political dynamics. Without improvements to governance and modifications to the 
country’s patronage policies, economic change will be limited at best. Elites’ preferences 
for blocking political reform has hampered achievement of economic goals and will 
continue to prove problematic if not rescinded. 
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A.  OVERVIEW 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) is at an economic and social crossroads. In 
April 2016, the government announced Saudi Vision 2030, a reform plan that addresses 
growing modern challenges that threaten the sustainability of the entrenched societal 
model. Oil discovered in 1938 eventually fueled state-led development that shaped the 
rentier state of today where the government, clergy, and population agree to coexist under 
a symbiotic social contract.1 In this system, the people render political acquiescence to 
the monarchy in exchange for a subsidized life, while the clerics support the House of 
Saud for the price of religious semi-autonomy. Traditionally, oil revenues funded public 
sector jobs, provided free education, reduced the cost of living, etc. Despite repeated 
attempts to modify this dynamic, the country’s economic and social models remain much 
the same today as they did four decades ago. Yet changes in global energy markets and 
expansion of the Saudi population indicate that this way of life may soon end. The new 
vision is essentially a way to modify the social contract while preserving royal power. As 
Thomas Lippman notes, “Saudi Arabia is conducting a giant, long-running laboratory 
experiment on itself to determine whether it can modernize its economy, its style of 
living, and its relations with the rest of the world without abandoning its cherished 
traditions.”2 
The Saudi Arabia that the world knows today began to take shape in the 1950s, 
while organized attempts to diversify the government’s revenue sources and the 
composition of the country’s industries began with the First Five-Year Development Plan 
in 1970.3 The government has implemented iterative plans every five years since then, 
shifting focus on physical infrastructure, human development, regulations, etc., as 
needed. The country’s leadership placed greater emphasis on diversification and 
                                                 
1 Steffen Hertog, Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats: Oil and the State in Saudi Arabia (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2010), 13–15. 
2 Thomas Lippman, Saudi Arabia on the Edge (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2012), 4. 
3 Tim Niblock, Saudi Arabia: Power, Legitimacy, and Survival (London: Routledge, 2006), 50. 
 2 
privatization of the economy after periods of prolonged budget deficits in the 1980s and 
1990s.4 Despite significant achievements in building the modern state in just over a half 
century, the record of implementing desired reforms is mixed at best, as Greg Gause 
notes that “‘Doing very little’ is the bane of all Saudi reform efforts.”5 
This thesis’ first main finding is that the structure of the government prevents 
policy implementation. Coordination between ministries is poor since most are headed by 
a prince or technocrat who runs his organization like a “fiefdom,” resulting in a highly 
centralized “hub-and-spoke” bureaucratic structure where the country’s key leaders sit at 
the intersection of the government’s independent entities.6 Additionally, most ministries 
are divided into three tiers, so ideas that develop at the national level do not fully reach 
all of the state’s employees, particularly the most junior personnel who carry out the day 
to day operations of the government. In addition to facing this constraint, the state must 
convince the conservative population that social liberalization is a positive change while 
convincing young people and the business elite alike that economic modernization is in 
their best interest. Another key finding is that KSA does not fit all aspects of the 
description of the classic rentier state and that it partially suffers the effects of the 
resource curse. Oil wealth made the country better off in many ways, but it also restricts 
policy choices, leads to macroeconomic underperformance, and distorts the labor market. 
Some government efforts have reduced, but not eradicated, the impact of the curse. 
Finally, the competitiveness of Saudi workers and companies is insufficient to create a 
knowledge economy, but these measures do not inhibit economic reform on their own 
because they are a side effect of government policy and the oil curse.  
The central finding of this thesis is that patronage is the crucial impediment for 
the Saudi state to overcome in implementing Vision 2030 successfully. Patronage plays a 
central role in shaping the Saudi political system and economy and in creating opposition 
                                                 
4 Tim Niblock and Monica Malik, The Political Economy of Saudi Arabia (New York: Routledge, 
2007), 57–65, 104–08. 
5 Gregory Gause, “Saudi Arabia at a Crossroads? Notes from a Recent Visit” Strategic Insights 3, no. 
2 (2011), https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/11180/
gauseFeb04.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. 
6 Hertog, Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats, 13, 17, 31. 
 3 
to political change. The implications are more far reaching than simply creating rent 
seeking attitudes. Patronage shapes the structure of the government, influences education 
and employment choices, defines the relationship between the people and the state, and 
limits the monarchy’s autonomy. Governance attitudes and outcomes also factor in 
patronage considerations, which in turn shape how the government manages the 
country’s oil wealth to meet society’s needs. 
This thesis examines the strengths and weaknesses of the political economy of 
Saudi Arabia as they relate to the state’s capacity to engage in economic and social 
reform. Foreign policy is discussed briefly due to its economic importance regarding 
KSA’s position as the world’s leading crude oil exporter and the birthplace of Islam. The 
paper’s scope excludes direct discussion of many topics commonly featured in Western 
literature and media, such as opinions of the country’s human rights record, the history of 
Wahhabism and its connection to Salafi-inspired terrorism, or the struggle against Iran 
for leadership in the Islamic world, to include implications regarding the wars in Syria 
and Yemen. 
B. VISION 2030: TACKLING KSA’S CHALLENGES 
Vision 2030 is essentially a revolution disguised as a bold reform measure. Most of 
the targets center on social constructs and economic policies and practices that support a 
volatile and unsustainable growth model. Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman (MbS) is 
the plan’s patron and orchestrator, and the scale and timelines of changes he is seeking are 
vast and aggressive. Western press has covered his political career’s rapid rise since his 
father became king in 2015.7 After MbS took charge of the ministries responsible for the 
economy and defense as Deputy Crown Prince, which entailed announcing Vision 2030 
and running the war in Yemen, the king promoted him to Crown Prince and thus heir 
apparent in June 2017.8 
                                                 
7 Ben Hubbard, “Saudi King Rewrites Succession, Replacing Heir with Son, 31,” New York Times, 
June 21, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/. 
8 Ibid. 
 4 
King Salman’s decision to remove Crown Prince Mohammad bin Nayef (MbN) 
increases the likelihood that the country’s new economic vision will receive the political 
support that it needs from the monarchy over the next decade. Western speculation 
questioned the viability of the program if MbN ascended the throne, since a large portion 
of MbS’ political clout appears tied to the success of these economic reforms and to the 
stagnant Yemen war.9 Skeptics may view Vision 2030 as a power grab, but the amount of 
resources devoted to the plan in the face of pressures to uphold the status quo point to a 
genuine desire to reinvent the country by revolutionizing how the kingdom conducts 
business and what it means to be Saudi. 
1. Purpose 
Vision 2030 subdivides into three themes that shape its intended areas of focus: 
“A vibrant society, a thriving economy and an ambitious nation.”10 Economic change 
cannot occur in isolation, so modifications in governance and the role of population must 
also take place. Addressing challenges in each area is necessary to achieve the overall 
vision. The project seeks to revitalize the long-standing policies of diversification away 
from oil, privatization of productive industries, and employment of more citizens in the 
private sector via “Saudization.”11 The plan also introduces new approaches to augment 
the primary economic and social policies. 
a. Why Now 
Besides a lackluster history of reform, several other factors pushed the monarchy to 
seek change. Economic stressors are forcing change upon the Saudi system, with 
immediate pressure coming from decreased oil prices that began in 2014. The Saudi 
Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), the country’s central bank, issued $17.5 billion in 
                                                 
9 Simon Henderson, “Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030, One Year On,” The Washington Institute for Near 
East Policy, April 24, 2017, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/saudi-arabias-vision-
2030-one-year-on. 
10 “Vision 2030,” Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 13, http://vision2030.gov.sa/en. 
11 Ibid., 36–46. 
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bonds in 2016 in order to support the government’s budget.12 Besides the dollar figure, this 
event was notable since it was the first time that SAMA listed Saudi treasury bonds 
internationally.13 The prospects of oil prices returning to pre-2014 levels are unlikely due 
to changes in global production, particularly the emergence of shale in the United States 
and Canada. 
A second reason to implement the new vision now is to harness the energy of the 
population. King Salman appointed nine grandsons and great-grandsons of King 
Abdulaziz to deputy governor positions in June 2017.14 He also named Abdulaziz bin 
Saud, another of King Abdulaziz’s great grandsons, to Interior Minister.15 This reflects 
the change where young people are becoming more significant actors in Saudi Arabian 
politics, in addition to comprising the bulk of the workforce. It is crucially important for 
the monarchy to facilitate an environment where the next generation can thrive. 
Approximately half of the population is under the age of 30.16 The youth bulge may have 
factored into King Salman’s decision to promote MbS to Crown Prince; placing the first 
grandson of King Abdulaziz in line for the throne can facilitate aligning the monarchy’s 
perspective with its population. 
Finally, time is of the essence. Reforms need to shift economic growth to 
privately owned non-oil sources before the government is unable to sustain the 
population.17 Unemployment is high, particularly among young people. Additional 
                                                 
12 Jeffrey P. Snider, “What Happens Overseas Doesn’t Necessarily Stay Overseas,” Seeking Alpha, 
November 17, 2016, https://seekingalpha.com/article/4024181-happens-overseas-necessarily-stay-overseas; 
“Ministry of Finance Appoints Mr. Alsayari to Lead the Debt Management Office,” Ministry of Finance, 
February 23, 2017, https://www.mof.gov.sa/en/MediaCenter/news/Pages/news_23022017.aspx. 
13 Davide Barbuscia and Sudip Roy, “Saudi Arabia Sets Record with Mammoth $17.5 Billion Bond 
Issue,” Reuters, October 19, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-bonds-idUSKCN12J1E7. 
14 Karen Elliot House, “Saudi Arabia in Transition: From Defense to Offense, But How to Score?” 
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, July 2017, 6–7, http://www.belfercenter.org/sites/
default/files/files/publication/SA%20Transition%20-%20web.pdf. 
15  “PROFILE: New Saudi Interior Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Saud bin Nayef,” Al Arabiya, June 
21, 2017, https://english.alarabiya.net/en/features/2017/06/21/PROFILE-The-new-Saudi-Interior-
Minister.html. 
16 “The World Factbook: Saudi Arabia,” Central Intelligence Agency, Accessed August 22, 2017, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sa.html. 
17 Luay Al-Khatteeb, “Saudi Arabia’s economic time bomb,” Brookings Institution, December 30, 
2015, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/saudi-arabias-economic-time-bomb/. 
 6 
concerns lie in the future demand for Saudi oil, whether from stronger crude competition, 
the rise of renewables, or global climate change policy.18 Environmental degradation is 
changing the physical landscape and will have future political implications, which will 
impact a variety of policies.19 Projections for physical habitability in the Gulf are 
depressing, with temperature increases and water security being primary concerns. Life in 
KSA, and the region at large, is on track to be possible only indoors via air-conditioning 
by the end of the century.20 
b. Achieving the Goals 
Vision 2030 is quite ambitious, as detailed in Figure 1, but its benchmarks must 
be aggressive if some degree of structural change is to occur over the next 13 years. 
Various ministers attest that their superiors robustly monitor their progress and that rapid 
change is the expected standard.21 In addition to renewed attempts at diversification, 
privatization, and Saudization, the vision seeks to implement several novel initiatives 
designed to stimulate interest in the country, better manage resources, and improve the 
quality of life for both citizens and foreigners. Examples include developing a tourism 
industry outside of religious pilgrimage, integrating solar power into the electrical grid, 
and developing a cultural ministry that creates venues for entertainment.22 The new 
approaches reflect that young Saudis are interested in a lifestyle that is more liberal and 
modern compared to their parents’ and grandparents’ generations. 
The vision’s policy implementation mechanisms take shape in 13 programs: 
Government Restructuring, Strategic Directions, Fiscal Balance, Project Management, 
Regulations Review, Performance Measurement, Saudi Aramco Strategic Transformation, 
                                                 
18 Emran El-Badawi, “When the Largest Oil Exporter Quits The Game,” Forbes, October 10, 2016, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/uhenergy/2016/10/10/when-the-largest-oil-exporter-quits-the-
game/#6feb7f779ac7.  
19 James Russell, “Saudi Arabia: The Strategic Dimensions of Environmental Insecurity,” Middle East 
Policy 23, no. 2 (2016): 44–58. doi://dx.doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12194.  
20 Ibid. 
21 “Davos 2017 - Saudi Arabia Vision 2030,” YouTube video, World Economic Forum, January 19, 
2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ef8fjnTFGGo. 
22 “Vision 2030,” Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 7–27. 
 7 
Public Investment Fund Restructuring, Human Capital, National Transformation, 
Strengthening Public Sector Governance, Privatization, and Strategic Partnerships.23 
Several of these projects are quite broad, while others focus on one specific topic. The 
subcomponent programs will commence in a phased approach over the next decade.  
The first and most significant initiative so far is the National Transformation 
Program (NTP), which gained attention as the umbrella project for many of the other 
items listed previously. The NTP essentially replaced the 10th five-year development 
plan.24 The program outlines 178 objectives and 340 targets related to public finance, 
investment policy, jobs, privatization, exports, the business environment, the role of 
women, energy, mining, and health care.25 
The Fiscal Balance Program (FBP) is the second major initiative that the 
government made public. Like the NTP, the target date is 2020. Jadwa Investment’s 
analysis of the initiative’s impact is significant, estimating a savings of SR362 billion if 
all targets are met.26 This analysis differs slightly from FBP calculations, but the 
conclusion is similar to the government’s view that the FBP can enable a budget surplus. 
                                                 
23 Ibid., 78–83. 
24 “Saudi Arabia’s New Development Plan Shows Clear Commitment to Education and the Private 
Sector,” Oxford Business Group, Accessed August 22, 2017, https://www.oxfordbusinessgroup.com/
analysis/long-game-new-development-plan-shows-clear-commitment-education-and-private-sector. 
25 Ahmed Feteha, “A Quick Guide to the Saudi National Transformation Program,” Bloomberg, June 
7, 2016, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-06-06/the-saudi-national-transformation-
program-what-we-know-so-far; Simon Henderson, “Vision or Mirage? Saudi Arabia’s Ambitious 
Economic Plans,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 17, 2016, 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/vision-or-mirage-saudi-arabias-ambitious-
economic-plans.  




Figure 1.  Key Economic Targets of Vision 2030 and NTP27 
2. Challenges 
Saudi Arabia faces several key political, social, and economic challenges. Some 
of the problems are new but many have persisted for years. The 2016 Annual Meeting of 
                                                 
27 Source: International Monetary Fund, Middle East and Central Asia Dept. “Saudi Arabia: Staff 




Arab Ministers of Finance, an IMF sponsored forum, framed the issue this way: “Oil-
exporting Arab countries face three-pronged policy challenges: creating jobs in line with 
rapidly growing population, sheltering their economy from volatility of oil prices and 
ensuring sustainable growth once oil resources are depleted.”28 Saudi Arabia fits such a 
description, but its case is more complex. Projections for oil prices that are necessary to 
maintain the rentier state of today estimate a requirement of $175 per barrel in 2025 and 
$320 by 2030.29 The monarchy must determine how to maintain its position while 
integrating its traditional society into global norms and into a world that seeks to reduce 
its dependence on crude oil for its energy needs.30 The leadership must also balance 
internal change with geopolitics, particularly its rivalry with Iran, which includes the war 
in Yemen.31 Essentially, as Simon Henderson notes, “The policy challenge is how to do 
all this—war and economic transformation—in a period of sustained low oil prices, 
which, in a world of high U.S. shale production, may well not see the same cyclical 
recovery as in the past.”32  
a. Thriving Economy 
The most significant economic and social challenge that the country faces is 
reducing unemployment of its citizens. This problem is multi-layered. Overall 
unemployment is around 12 percent, but the rate for women exceeds 30 percent, as 
highlighted in Figure 2. Just as important as creating jobs for women is creating jobs for 
young people, since unemployment for Saudis aged 15–24 is approximately 30 percent.33 
                                                 
28 IMF Staff, “Economic Diversification in Oil-Exporting Arab Countries,” International Monetary 
Fund, April 2016, 7, https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2016/042916.pdf.  
29 Robert Looney, “Saudi Arabia: Out of Options?” Milken Institute Review, September 15, 
2016, http://www.milkenreview.org/articles/saudi-arabia-out-of-options.  
30 James Russell, “In the Furnace: Saudi Arabia and the Dynamics of Global Climate Change,” in 
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Percent of total labor force for each gender 
Figure 2.  Unemployment Rate of Nationals by Gender34 
Creating new jobs for the right demographic groups is necessary but insufficient 
to tackle unemployment. Saudization is vitally important for the future of the country. 
The public sector has long been the preferred employer of choice for its citizens, but 
minimum capacity remains for the bureaucracy to take on more employees into 
government service as a function of the state’s patronage system.35 Although the oil 
sector drives the economy, it produces relatively few jobs since it is primarily a capital-
intensive industry.36 The private sector employs vastly more people than the public 
sector, but low cost foreign workers fill the majority of these positions. 
Oil itself has several characteristics that lead to negative outcomes.37 Oil is 
nonrenewable and is not produced, so the amount of revenue that oil can generate is 
ultimately finite. Dependency on oil rents does not force the economy to generate 
                                                 
34 Source: IMF Staff, “2016 Article IV Consultation,” 36. 
35 Steffen Hertog, “A Comparative Assessment of Labor Market Nationalization Policies in the 
GCC,” in National Employment, Migration, and Education in the GCC, ed. Steffen Hertog (Berlin: Gerlach 
Press, 2012), 65. 
36 Giacomo Luciani, “From Price Taker to Price Maker? Saudi Arabia and the World Oil Market,” in 
Saudi Arabia in Transition: Insights on Social, Political, Economic, and Religious Change, ed. Bernard 
Haykel, Thomas Hegghammer, and Stéphane Lacroix (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 92. 
37 Luciani, “From Price Taker to Price Maker?” 72–75. 
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tradable goods in the same way that is necessary in resource poor countries, which has 
stunted the expansion of private manufacturing beyond downstream petroleum 
production.38 Oil prices are also notoriously volatile. Since 90 percent of the state’s 
revenue is from hydrocarbons that flow through Aramco, the government’s revenues are 
subject to market volatility.39 This outcome makes budget planning difficult, with pro-
cyclical fiscal policies leading to current accounts repeatedly falling short of expectations 
and needs, as noted in Figure 3. The kingdom has enjoyed its status as the world’s swing 
oil producer over the past several decades, a result of producing at the lowest cost that 
enabled the kingdom to somewhat affect market prices. The shale revolution in the 
United States and Canada threatens this ability. Also, peak demand is now a greater 
concern for leading crude exporters instead of peak supply, due to increased competition, 
the anticipated rise of renewables and global climate change policies.40 
 
Figure 3.  2020 Budget Scenario41 
                                                 
38 Ibid. 
39 Gassan Al-Kibsi et al., “Moving Saudi Arabia’s Economy Beyond Oil,” McKinsey Global Institute, 
December 2015, http://www.mckinsey.com/global-themes/employment-and-growth/moving-saudi-arabias-
economy-beyond-oil. 
40 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, “Resource Security in Saudi Arabia: Domestic Challenges and Global 
Implications,” in The New Politics of Strategic Resources: Energy and Food Security Challenges in the 
21st Century, ed. David Steven, Emily O’Brien, and Bruce Jones (Washington, DC, Brookings Institution 
Press, 2015), 176–80. 
41 Source: Jadwa Investment, “Fiscal Balance Program.” 
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b. Vibrant Society 
The monarchy needs to effectively manage the expectations of its burgeoning 
youth population.42 The primary channel to address this issue is by addressing 
unemployment, as mentioned above. The number of young Saudis entering the labor 
market each year outpaces the number of private sector jobs that the economy is currently 
creating.43 Opportunities beyond employment are also necessary. Changes in education 
are taking root to adequately prepare young people to compete in international markets, 
but many graduates still enter the labor market after being groomed to become a 
bureaucrat. 
Enabling stronger human capital is necessary for all, but the country is 
underutilizing its female workforce. More women than men now graduate from Saudi 
universities, but many do not put their skills to use professionally. The kingdom has an 
untapped labor resource that it could activate if it can shift attitudes about the role of 
women in the workplace. This solution is simple and necessary, but it will not necessarily 
be easy to overcome long-standing prejudices. 
Unlike the region’s republics, the Saudi monarchy had the resources to buy off 
dissent among its population during the Arab Spring. The budget projections above 
indicate that the state may not have this ability in the future, and thus would likely resort 
to repression as was the case in Egypt, Syria, etc. This prospect is dangerous for 
maintaining the monarchy’s legitimacy. 
c. Ambitious Nation 
Governance improvements are necessary to improve the bureaucracy’s 
effectiveness, and therefore the chances of improving the structure of the economy and the 
quality of life for the kingdom’s citizens. While unveiling Vision 2030, MbS stated that 
improving transparency is important if the Saudi economy is to become more competitive 
                                                 
42 Bernard Haykel, Thomas Hegghammer, and Stéphane Lacroix. “Introduction,” in Saudi Arabia in 
Transition: Insights on Social, Political, Economic, and Religious Change, ed. Bernard Haykel, Thomas 
Hegghammer, and Stéphane Lacroix (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 2. 
43 Hertog, “A Comparative Assessment of Labor Market Nationalization Policies in the GCC,” 65–68. 
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globally.44 Improving transparency is a repeated prescription in the academic literature for 
combatting corruption and other ills associated with natural resource exports. 
Improving the government’s capacity is also needed to address the country’s 
international public image. Within the context of reform, the primary necessity is 
attracting foreign direct investment (FDI). External investment is needed to drive 
industrial diversification and growth and to fund the reform programs themselves. The 
budget for the NTP alone is $72 billion.45 Changing the world’s view of Saudi Arabia 
from a country that places minimal attention on human rights or hosts the cradle of 
Wahhabi extremism to one that represents an excellent business opportunity requires 
fundamentally different views and practices from within the monarchy and the 
government. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The government’s attempts to diversify the economy, privatize productive 
industries, and employ Saudi citizens in the private sector throughout the nine 
development plans produced insufficient change. Given this history and the similarity of 
the central aims of Vision 2030, this thesis seeks to answer the following question: What 
are the primary institutional barriers to economic and social reform in Saudi Arabia? 
1. Hypotheses 
The three following chapters examine one hypothesis each: social, political, and 
economic, respectively. The first area of focus is that the structure of Saudi government 
and society is sufficiently divided to prevent implementation of reform on a consistent 
basis. The ministries within the Saudi bureaucracy are not all created equal, and 
examining the multi-layered vertical power structures within them enables a more 
detailed understanding of where bottlenecks occur even when the Council of Ministers 
implements policy changes. This perspective dovetails into a discussion of the rentier 
                                                 
44 “Full Transcript of Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s Al Arabiya interview,” Al Arabiya, April 25, 
2016, https://english.alarabiya.net/en/media/inside-the-newsroom/2016/04/25/Full-Transcript-of-Prince-
Mohammed-bin-Salman-s-Al-Arabiya-interview.html.  
45 “Saudi National Transformation Plan Aims for Revenue Surge,” Arab News, June 7, 2016, 
http://www.arabnews.com/node/935796/saudi-arabia. 
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social contract between the people and the monarchy, which imposes limits on the 
latitude of decisions available to the elites that govern via patronage. Finally, entrenched 
vested interests that will lose influence under social and economic liberalization and 
modernization are likely to do what they can to delay implementation of reforms that 
threaten their position. 
A second possibility is that Saudi Arabia suffers from the resource curse, where 
reliance on externally derived natural resource rents leads to a host of political and 
economic problems, including weak state capacity, that are structural in nature and hence 
very difficult to resolve. The autocratic monarchy should have the ability to impose 
domestic reforms at will, but this has clearly not been the case. Windfall profits that 
occur during boom periods delay the need to implement changes that increase 
sustainability. Exporters with high levels of rent fall into a “staple trap” that shapes elite 
behavior, retards growth, and reduces the likelihood of structural reform.46 This tendency 
of resource centered economies to struggle with diversification is reflected in Saudi 
Arabia by oil’s continued dominance, which limits the country’s ability to move through 
economic stages that support long term growth. 
A third hypothesis is that market inefficiencies limit the scope of what activities 
the Saudi economy can perform, stunting implementation of policies that would benefit 
the country. The key manifestation is in the labor market, where Saudi citizens’ overall 
human capital is too expensive and insufficiently skilled to boost Total Factor 
Productivity (TFP). Labor problems coincide with the need to expand the manufacturing 
base into new markets in the face of competition from well-established producers. 
Further complicating diversification is that the country’s sole comparative advantage is 
access to cheap energy, and that the economy’s competitiveness is tied to the volatile 
macroeconomic environment. 
                                                 
46 Richard Auty, “The Oil Curse: Causes, Consequences, and Policy Implications,” in Handbook of 
Oil Politics, ed. Robert E. Looney (New York: Routledge, 2012), 340. 
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2. Significance 
Determining the most significant reform roadblocks highlights current strengths 
and weaknesses, which increases understanding of how Vision 2030 is likely to succeed 
and struggle. The program’s success will greatly impact how KSA will change over the 
next several decades. It is impossible to say what percentage of the vision will 
materialize, but the amount of change that Vision 2030 achieves will directly impact the 
region and the rest of the world.47 
Informed policy choices that shape U.S.-Saudi bilateral relations rely on 
knowledge of Saudi strengths and weaknesses. A more sustainable model enables Saudi 
leadership to choose from a wider range of options for employing resources, including 
efforts to reduce dependence on U.S. security.48 America’s relationship with the kingdom 
impacts other regional alliances, made clear via KSA instituting an embargo and cutting 
diplomatic ties with Qatar following President Trump’s May 2017 trip to Riyadh.49 
Understanding how the Saudi economy can change is important to American 
businesses active in the region. Besides energy corporations, manufacturing firms such as 
General Electric and Dow Chemical continue to play a role in the country’s industrial 
development.50 Successful diversification will create opportunities for additional 
companies to invest in other fields. The government is actively seeking to boost FDI 
through the efforts of the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA), but also 
by sending prominent ministers to promote the country at economic and academic 
conferences (e.g., World Economic Forum, Washington think tanks).51 
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The Saudi Arabia that emerges throughout and after Vision 2030 will shape the 
kingdom’s political and economic relationships with other key countries. Saudi Arabia 
and Iran dominate the Persian Gulf and are central figures in the larger Middle East. 
Their competition for regional hegemony is long running and continuously evolving, and 
a Saudi internal shakeup will impact the kingdom’s ability to fight the proxy wars where 
these states face off. Changes to Saudi energy policy will impact KSA’s customers and 
competitors, specifically China’s efforts to shift its economy from an export to consumer 
driven model. Reduced Saudi crude production that seeks to raise prices is already 
presenting opportunities for other producers to fill the void. Saudi diversification away 
from oil will reshape the international energy market. 
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II. STATE AND SOCIETY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Saudi Arabia’s status as a rentier state shapes the structure of the government and 
society, sufficiently dividing institutions to prevent implementation of reform on a 
consistent basis. The ministries within the Saudi bureaucracy are not all created equal, 
and examining the multi-layered vertical power structures within them enables a more 
detailed understanding of where bottlenecks occur, even when the Council of Ministers 
implements policy changes. This perspective dovetails into a discussion of the social 
contract between the people and the government. The monarchy needs to modify the 
rentier bargain without ceding authority, which imposes limits on the latitude of decisions 
available to elites. Saudi Arabian society is very traditional, so change must come from 
within and occur at a pace that the population can accept. Despite Vision 2030’s 
aggressive benchmark timelines, the population is not poised to undergo social and 
economic shock therapy. Also, entrenched vested interests that will lose influence under 
social and economic liberalization and modernization are likely to do what they can to 
delay implementation of reforms that threaten their position. 
Although Saudi Arabia’s political economy is typically considered the prime 
example of a rentier state, recent research indicates that the story is actually more 
nuanced. The patronage that underpins the system creates constraints on the monarchy’s 
ability to act autonomously with little consideration of popular will. The government’s 
participation in the economy hampers private sector growth, while its attempts to create 
jobs for Saudi citizens are also out of sync with its desire to promote privatization. 
B. POLITICAL ECONOMY 
The modern state of Saudi Arabia that King Abdulaziz Al Saud founded is just 85 
years old. The amount of development and state building that occurred during this time is 
drastically compressed compared to state formation processes in Europe that spanned 
centuries. Saudi Arabia is distinct from most other Middle East and North African 
(MENA) states because it is one of few areas that Europe never colonized. External 
 18 
influence in the country for the last 200 years has primarily come in the form of 
economic interests that center on oil exploration and production, in addition to external 
security provided by the United Kingdom and the United States in the 20th century. 
Middle Eastern states fall into two broad political categories based on regime 
type, specifically republics and monarchies. Melani Cammett et al. classify states into 
three economic groups based on oil rents per capita:52 Resource Rich Labor Poor (RRLP) 
have oil rents per capita of at least $10,000; Resource Rich Labor Abundant (RRLA) at 
$250-10,000 per capita; and Resource Poor Labor Abundant (RPLA) produce less than 
$250 per capita. Saudi Arabia falls into the RRLP category along with the rest of the 
GCC.53 The kingdom is a high-income country, although it has the next to lowest GDP 
per capita in the GCC due to its larger population.54 
1. Political System 
Unlike modern constitutional monarchies, the Saudi king is both head of state and 
head of government. The king is also the prime minister, so matters of state flow through 
him, as show in Figure 4. He authorizes appointments to the Council of Ministers, the 
body that heads the bureaucracy. Many of the top members of the royal family chair one 
or several of the kingdom’s 22 ministries, although some ministers are non-royal 
technocrats.55 The Shura Council is a second important body that can submit legislation 
for the king’s approval. The country does not have a parliament or political parties. The 
13 regions have royally appointed governors, but citizens do elect local leaders. The 
constitution is officially the Quran and the Sunna, although the Basic Law comprises 
                                                 
52 Melani Cammett et al., A Political Economy of the Middle East (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
2015), 24–26. 
53 Ibid. 
54 “World Bank Country and Lending Groups,” The World Bank, Accessed August 22, 2017, 
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55 “About Saudi Arabia,” Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, Washington, DC, 
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additional legislation. The legal system is organized categorically, with the majority of 
cases going before Shari’ah courts.56 
 
Figure 4.  The Dynamics of Saudi Arabian Politics57 
a. Rentier State 
Hazem Beblawi modernized the rentier concept after studying the impacts of Gulf 
states’ oil revenue windfalls in the 1970s.58 In these economies, a small percentage of the 
                                                 
56 “About Saudi Arabia,” Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia. 
57 Source: Niblock, Saudi Arabia, 9. 
58 Hazem Beblawi, “The Rentier State in the Arab World,” Arab Studies Quarterly 9, no. 4 (Fall, 
1987): 384–86.  
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population generates externally derived rents, which ultimately accrue to the government. 
Economic rent is defined as “The difference between the market price of a good or factor 
of production and its opportunity cost.”59 
No single, unified definition of rentier theory exists, highlighted by Matthew 
Gray’s three stages that shape the history of the narrative.60 Three key themes do 
circulate widely throughout the literature.61 First, the external nature of such rents 
removes the need for governments to tax the population, so the state focuses on 
distribution of resources. The net result is that the state is not accountable to the people, 
which enables politicians to act autonomously since there is “No representation without 
taxation.”62 Second, the distributive policies weaken state capacity, since there is no need 
to penetrate society in order to manage tax revenues.63 This degrades the quality of the 
institutions that support the business environment. Additionally, rent-seeking behavior is 
more profitable than increasing productive activity, stunting the need to diversify the 
composition of a country’s GDP. Third, the state becomes the center of the economy and 
society.64 Patronage shapes social constructs and limits the ability of civil society to 
bargain with the elite. 
The existing Saudi social contract between the state and society is a tradeoff that 
fits the above distributive system, with the government allocating resources via multiple 
forms of patronage in exchange for political submission to the al-Saud family’s rule with 
minimal expressions of political dissent. In essence, the king buys the people’s loyalty 
with oil rents. As long as citizens’ needs are met, the king can operate with relative 
autonomy. Jean-François Seznec argues that the macroeconomic climate is rendering the 
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Saudi rentier dynamic as unviable, but he also cautions that introducing taxation does not 
always lead to representation.65 
Gause and Hertog qualify the Saudi experience compared to the traditional 
understanding of the rentier state.66 They both counter Kiren Aziz Chaudhry’s argument 
that the absence of taxation precludes the government from penetrating society, thus 
making it less capable than the pre-oil Saudi state.67 Evidence against this notion is that 
the government utilizes alternative mechanisms that make it central to lives of its people 
and to the operation of the economy. Gause goes on to argue that KSA has acted as an 
“Oil state exception,” because it avoided political change despite several periods of 
prolonged fiscal woes by leveraging large foreign reserves, relying on internal debt 
through the country’s banks, and using its position as the world’s crude oil swing 
producer.68 Jane Kinninmont highlights that the monarchy’s ability to again delay 
economic reform via such methods is at an end, although external pressures are not yet 
forcing political reform.69 
b. Fractured Government 
Hertog argues that the Saudi government and its society is more complexly 
divided compared to the unified state that is used as the level of analysis in the rentier 
narrative.70 His analysis of the processes required to enact the Foreign Investment Act in 
2000 and to complete accession to the World Trade Organization in 2005, which were the 
most significant reform outcomes of the past few decades, reveal that while support for 
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Saudi_Energy_Changes_web_0323.pdf. 
66 Gregory Gause, “Oil and Political Mobilization in Saudi Arabia,” in Saudi Arabia in Transition, 15; 
Hertog, Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats, 265, 272. 
67 Kiren Aziz Chaudhry, The Price of Wealth: Economies and Institutions in the Middle East (New 
York: Cornell University Press, 1997), 6–16. 
68 Gregory Gause, “Oil and Political Mobilization in Saudi Arabia,” in Saudi Arabia in Transition, 28. 
69 Jane Kinninmont, “Vision 2030 and Saudi Arabia’s Social Contract: Austerity and 
Transformation,” Chatham House, July 20, 2017, 42, https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/vision-
2030-and-saudi-arabias-social-contract-austerity-and-transformation.  
70 Hertog, Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats, 181, 243. 
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these measures was mixed in government and society, internal divisions diluted and 
delayed the final outcomes.71 
Hertog claims that “It is the clientelist and fragmented nature of the Saudi system, 
both formal and informal, and the accompanying dominance of vertical links that explain 
specific coordination failures and bureaucratic capacity problems.”72 The bureaucracy 
operates like a wheel with spokes, where the king is at the center and each minister is the 
conduit between the hub and the various ministries located on the spokes.73 Some parts 
of the government integrate with each other, but most operate separately. The system 
breaks down into macro, meso, and micro sub-levels, in addition to creating avenues for 
brokers to connect individuals to the patronage apparatus, (e.g., sponsoring foreign 
businesses).74 
The divisions among ministries also perpetuated the failure of Saudization, but in 
this example disorganization was the key problem.75 Significant support existed for 
various iterations of the long-standing policy, prompting individual elites to pursue public 
recognition for their efforts to make the private sector an engine of job creation for 
citizens. The outcome was that the Ministries of Interior, Labor, Commerce, Justice, etc., 
operated essentially independently, pursuing different approaches that were 
uncoordinated at a higher level.76 The dynamic of many small, segregated steps produced 
little progress toward achieving desired results.  
2. State and Economy 
Crude oil exports drive the economy, although expansion into other sectors over 
the last several decades elevated Saudi manufacturing beyond the productive capacity of 
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 the rest of the GCC and the majority of MENA states.77 The public sector contains the 
 country’s largest firms, including oil giant Saudi Aramco. The government’s 
privatization efforts to date primarily consist of creating Public Private Partnerships 
(PPP). Chemical producer Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) is the most 
notable example, with the state owning 70 percent of the company.78 
Figure 5 shows the impact of the sharp decreases in global oil prices in 2014, 
which led to the first budget and current account deficits in years. Figure 6 provides 
greater detail of the scope of the kingdom’s weakened fiscal environment. The IMF 
assesses with high probability that “Persistently low energy prices” will continue for the 
foreseeable future, a stance that reflects the general consensus that shale production is 
leading to sufficient oversupply to minimize the impact of OPEC’s production cuts that 
started in late 2016.79 
 
Figure 5.  KSA Breakeven Oil Price80 
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Figure 6.  Selected Economic Indicators, 2011–1681 
a. Public to Private, Oil to Non-oil 
The Saudi economy has increased the size and scope of the private sector over the 
past several decades, but the government is still directly involved in the country’s 
productive capacity. Besides the focus on the 2018 Aramco IPO, the NTP plans to benefit 
the restructuring of the Public Investment Fund (PIF) by selling or partially privatizing a 
wide range of government services and companies, (e.g., petrochemicals, hospitals, 
pharmaceuticals, airports, sea ports, postal service, electricity, desalination, agriculture, 
and education).82 The government needs to convince investors that their using their 
                                                 
81 Source: IMF Staff, “2016 Article IV Consultation,” 4.  
82“National Transformation Program,” Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 24–27, 86–100, 
http://vision2030.gov.sa/sites/default/files/NTP_En.pdf. 
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capital to support Saudi society and manufacturing will benefit shareholders as much as 
the Saudi state.83 
Oil still dominates the Saudi economy, noted in Figure 7. Other industries have 
established some regional success, particularly plastic and petrochemical production, 
shown in Figure 8. These two industries benefit from access to cheap energy feedstock 
that go directly into the final manufactured products. Reliance on the country’s 
competitive advantage in energy has stretched the definition of diversification of tradable 
goods to include upstream production, (e.g., gasoline refining, which is not truly moving 
the country away from its reliance on petroleum). 
 
US$ billion 
Figure 7.  Net Incomes of Listed Saudi Corporates by Sector84 
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Figure 8.  Contribution to Non-oil Export Growth85 
b. Employment 
The distribution of the citizen labor force is approximately balanced between the 
public and private sectors, although foreign workers dominate the private sector and 
overall labor market, as shown in Figure 9. Saudis in the private sector primarily work in 
manufacturing and agriculture, indicated in Figure 10. The real challenge is creating new 
jobs in the private sector for nationals that currently are unemployed or underemployed. 
Official statistics do not capture the impact of the informal labor market. 
Creating new jobs is a simultaneous function of expanding the size and scope of 
the private sector. Solving unemployment is paramount, but it cannot happen under the 
current model. Cheap labor has been in place for decades, so employers must either 
become willing to pay more to hire Saudi citizens, or new jobs must arise that are 
designed to pay higher wages to skilled workers. This issue is examined further in 
Chapter IV, but it is integral to the role that the, economy plays in managing the 
relationship between state and society, so it is important to discuss in that context. 
                                                 
85 Source: IMF Staff, “2016 Article IV Consultation,” 34. 
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Figure 9.   Saudi Labor Market Segmentation86 
 
Year on year change 
Figure 10.  2015 Employment in Private Sector87 
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GCC,” 73. 
87 Source: IMF Staff, “2016 Article IV Consultation,” 36. 
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C. VESTED INTERESTS 
A natural place to begin looking for entrenched interests that desire to maintain 
the status quo is in the state’s key domestic relationships, particularly with the 
population, the clerics, and the elite. As Terry Lynn Karl notes, “Private vested interests” 
and the rentier state itself impede reform in oil exporters.88 As with any time major 
change is introduced into a social group, those who benefit from the new circumstances 
strive to create the new environment, while those who stand to lose position, authority, or 
resources do what they can to resist. Saudi Arabia is a conservative society, although the 
number of active social media users has rapidly expanded over the past decade, providing 
inroads for outside ideas.89 Globalization reaches into the country via King Abdullah 
foreign scholars. The question moving forward is to what extent are the liberal economic 
ideas that modernizing forces are spreading taking root among key sectors of society. 
1. Rentier Bargain 
MbS stated that the ultimate factor that will determine the success of the vision 
that he is leading is if the people come to accept and support it and the change that it 
represents.90 The existing patronage construct that supports the Saudi rentier model does 
not give carte blanche authority to the monarchy to impose its will upon the people 
without consent. Gwenn Okruhlik argues that the rentier framework tends to 
overemphasize the importance of economics in shaping the relationship between the state 
and citizens in oil states.91 She finds that many authors fail to recognize the role that 
politics play in forming policy. Just as important, leaders’ choices influence the timing 
and scale of dissent. Rentier theory claims that the distributive practices that replace 
extractive capacity render the people voiceless, but reality is more complex. 
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Okruhlik’s most interesting observation is that dissent occurred on at least five 
occasions, but during economic boom periods instead of the protracted recessions in 
Saudi Arabia’s history.92 The implication is that how and to whom the state provides 
preferential treatment does in fact create opposition forces. The kingdom’s poor scores 
for Voice on the World Bank’s governance index, which are discussed in Chapter III, tie 
into the monarchy’s reputation for buying silence. This strategy has staved off upheaval, 
particularly during the throes of the Arab Spring, although it highlights the state’s 
weakness in incorporating criticism of areas where it is weak and needs to promote 
reform.93 
The government cannot force its agenda through with the expectation that 
opponents will sit idly by and take what the state gives them. This does not mean that the 
regime will chart its course based on popular opinion, but it also cannot ignore the public 
will. A short-lived subsidy cut that lasted from September 2016 to April 2017 
demonstrated the sensitivity of public policy to popular sentiment. After reducing public 
sector employees’ bonuses and financial perks, King Salman elected to reinstate these 
benefits.94 MbS denied that popular pressure reversed the cuts, arguing that the 
government’s deficit declined by 44 percent in the first quarter of 2017, freeing up extra 
cash.95 Despite this testimony, the reality seems to be that the monarchy is sensitive to 
the criticism that the cuts generated from the bureaucrats upon whom it relies to carry out 
its policies and from the citizens with whom its ruling bargain originates. Reforms that 
consider popular acceptance are more likely to succeed. Acting outside of the will of the 
people simply furthers pro-cyclical policies that do not lead to change.96 
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2. Clerical Opposition 
The clerical establishment and reformers are bound to clash, since the 
implications of the reforms’ social changes would be a major blow to the religious 
establishment’s authority.97 Reforms threaten the compact between the houses of Saud 
and Wahhab, which is used to establish royal legitimacy and to promote puritanical 
theology.98 When previously faced with challenges emanating from outside these 
families, the best approach has been to coexist in order to keep their hold on politics, 
economics, and religion.99 The dynamics of today’s struggle are different, since change is 
coming from within the corridors of power; this does not mean that the notoriously 
conservative sector of the Saudi population will automatically embrace change. 
The conservative Hanbali leaders who dominate the country’s religious landscape 
cannot directly oppose the liberalizing forces that Vision 2030 is trying to impose on 
society; however, the Sunni clerical establishment plays a complex role in the country’s 
political dynamics and possess the capacity to hamper key portions of the current reform 
efforts. The clerics have traditionally dominated management of the education system’s 
curriculum.100 Any attempts to create a knowledge based economy will require broad 
educational modernization.  
Vision 2030 is a threat to the ulama’s legitimacy. Under privatization, the 
business community will encroach on the cleric’s market share of importance in the 
national psyche. Salafism’s puritanical dogma is a roadblock to some, although not all, 
foreign investors.101 The education system will need to prioritize secular curricula over 
religious teaching. Western, liberal ideals will coexist with increased global 
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integration.102 Women may drive and go uncovered in public on the Aramco 
headquarters campus,103 but little tolerance exists for these norms to expand to the rest of 
the country. 
3. Elites Holding On 
Convincing business owners to hire Saudi citizens and encouraging elites to 
expand business operations into new sectors requires an institutional shift to make such 
policies attractive and lucrative. Rent seeking exists in all economies, since all private 
sector companies and individuals seek to maximize profit. The opportunities to boost 
income via rents in the Saudi economy are greater than in most countries. 
Disenfranchisement from the current beneficial structure is not an incentive for the 
business community to simply adopt the government’s new policies. 
The private sector business community has benefitted from cheap foreign labor 
and state subsidized inputs in the pursuit of “‘Wealth creation’ for business owners, not 
‘economic value creation.’”104 This attitude will slow the shift of viewing the private 
sector as a supporter of the general welfare. While business owners stand to directly gain 
from the proposed reforms in the long term, opposition is likely, since operating costs 
will drastically increase in the short to mid-term.105 
D. SUMMARY 
Political realities and interests constrain economically sound policies in all 
countries, but Saudi Arabia must overturn structural political obstacles to create change. 
The kingdom’s rentier mechanisms do not fit all of the widely held arguments about state 
capacity, although the strong patronage ties that shape the relationship between state and 
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society limit the policy options available for reshaping the social contract. With no 
currently viable alternatives available to the government to replace its direct support of 
the population, it cannot expect citizens to wholeheartedly embrace a drastically different 
socioeconomic model to meet everyone’s needs. 
Patronage also creates the fractures that divide the bureaucracy and its links to 
society. Such a dynamic stunts policy enactment because the leadership’s initial intent 
does not penetrate all ministries at all levels, meaning implementation does not fully take 
root. A byproduct of this system is that it creates space for brokers to operate as conduits 
between elites who manage patronage based resources and private entities, both foreign 
and domestic, which perpetuates rentier conditions. 
The state maintains dominant positions in the economy’s most profitable sectors 
and firms, and its plans to privatize state owned enterprises (SOE) are really designed to 
create more PPPs. While this is a positive step for both the public and private sectors, 
continued government majority ownership means that the state is not actually creating an 
autonomous private sector. The most successful private businesses, (e.g., Saudi Binladin 
Group), directly benefit from government support, in the form of contracts and tax 
structure, but also from access to cheap labor via the existing labor market. Chapter IV 
examines Saudization efforts in more detail, but essentially the government’s attempts to 
force employers to hire citizens have not worked because they are bad for business. The 
result is that Saudization is currently incompatible with privatization of labor intensive 
industries. 
Finally, groups who stand to benefit from the status quo are naturally hesitant, or 
even opposed, to supporting modernization and liberalization in order to prevent loss of 
status, influence, access, wealth, etc. The kingdom is known for its staunch conservative 
attitudes and customs, and authorities with a traditional mindset can slow the pace of 
change. What ultimately matters is how the generation of young people that dominate the 
country’s demographics will define what it means to be Saudi once they assume 
leadership of the country. 
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III. THE RESOURCE CURSE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
After the oil busts of the late 1970s, academic debates questioned if countries 
reliant on externally derived natural resource rents actually suffer from their physical 
endowments since many case studies experienced a host of political and economic 
problems, including weak state capacity. MENA oil producers served as prime examples 
in the discussion. Saudi Arabia played a central role in the analysis since it is the world’s 
largest crude oil exporter. So, how does the resource curse impact Saudi Arabia, and does 
it inhibit reform? 
The autocratic monarchy should have the ability to impose domestic reforms at 
will, but this has clearly not been the case. Windfall profits that occur during boom 
periods delay the need to implement changes that increase sustainability. Exporters with 
high levels of rent fall into a “staple trap” that shapes elite behavior, retards growth, and 
reduces the likelihood of structural reform.106 This tendency of resource centered 
economies to struggle with diversification is reflected in Saudi Arabia by oil’s continued 
dominance, which limits the country’s ability to move through economic stages that 
support long term growth. 
Over the past two decades, critics of the classic resource curse have grown in 
number, and thus today there is a broad debate regarding whether the curse truly exists 
and if so, how and to what extent.107 This chapter outlines the fundamentals of the curse, 
describing its causes and impacts, and then reviews recommendations for mitigating 
associated negative consequences. Most suggestions outline political remedies to mitigate 
the harm already done and to ideally harness the potential that these resources could 
produce. This enables a discussion of Saudi Arabia’s experience with the curse, both in 
theory and as measured by real world data. After discussing the curse’s impact on the 
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kingdom, the chapter concludes with Saudi efforts designed to turn the world’s largest oil 
reserves into a sustainable economic base. 
B. THE RESOURCE CURSE 
The resource curse theory argues that most natural resource exporters experience 
a host of political, social and economic problems. Essentially such states are actually 
worse off today because of oil, minerals, etc. The following section discusses the 
resource curse, and its more specific manifestation the oil curse, to include its 
consequences and causes. Also included is an analysis of debates regarding the curse’s 
scope and applicability. 
The overarching trend among oil exporters shows that countries that developed 
strong institutions prior to discovering hydrocarbon deposits developed diverse, 
industrialized economies and strong political systems.108 Prime examples are Norway, 
Canada, and the United States. The vast majority of today’s producers did not have strong 
governance when in place, either because of colonial legacy, low populations, etc.109 The 
curse is found in this latter set of states that continue to attempt to stave off its effects. 
Michael Ross outlines three theories to explain economic policy mismanagement in 
resource rich states: “Cognitive explanations, which contend that resource booms 
produce a type of short-sightedness among policymakers; societal explanations, which 
argue that resource exports tend to empower . . . groups that favor growth-impeding 
policies; and state-centered explanations, which contend that resource booms tend to 
weaken state institutions.”110 
1. Theory 
Starting in the late 1970s, Middle Eastern scholars hypothesized that states reliant 
on natural resource exports, especially crude oil and natural gas, suffer from a resource 
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curse.111 Western academics became interested and soon a large body of work argued 
that economies driven by resource derived rents underperform compared to their potential 
performance and suffer from multiple associated economic, political, and social 
consequences.112 Further studies held that hydrocarbon resources are simply 
commodities that can be a curse or a blessing depending their management and overall 
governance. Critics stress the need for research to pay greater attention to the 
heterogeneity of resource producers, to consider long-term trends, and to evaluate the 
specific impacts of resource revenues instead of simply declaring them good or bad.113 
a. Concept’s History 
 The discussion of natural resources’ impact on political economy began with 
Adam Smith.114 Following an Economist article in 1977, the modern theory has rapidly 
grown in scope and scale; Badeeb, Hooi, and Clark provide the following milestones in 
the history of the discussion.115 Cordon and Neary observed the impact of natural gas 
exports on the Dutch economy in 1982, prompting the now ubiquitously referenced 
Dutch Disease. Gelb outlined the theory in 1988, while Auty devised the term “resource 
curse” in 1993. Sachs and Warner conducted the first significant empirical study to 
support the theory in 1995, and Gylfason showed the connection between resource 
dependence and economic growth in 2001. 
Several debates exist within the resource curse literature, primarily regarding 
whether mineral rents are actually a bane on resource exporters, (i.e., determining if the 
curse exists). The number of authors and scope of research into the problem expanded 
greatly in the 1990s as declining oil prices led to sustained fiscal deficits. The literature 
became more divisive in the 2000s, likely coincidental with the second oil boom that 
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emerged in 2002. Despite an increase in the number of challengers, recent publications, 
led by Ross’ Oil Curse, maintain that the theory holds for the broad number of exporters. 
Division also exists regarding the measurements used to assess the curse, in addition to 
criticism that the theory’s proponents over generalize.116 All researchers seek to prove 
the applicability of theory to case studies, yet it is important to keep the heterogeneity of 
countries’ experiences in perspective. 
b. Oil Curse 
Richard Auty defines the oil curse as “An extreme manifestation of a broader rent 
curse that is rooted in policy failure . . . and reflects the unusual capital intensity of 
hydrocarbon production,”117 which Ross highlights as extremely problematic because 
“The revenues oil bestows on governments are unusually large, do not come from taxes, 
fluctuate unpredictably, and can be easily hidden.”118 This paper is primarily interested in 
the oil curse vice the more general resource curse since oil is vastly more important to 
Saudi Arabia than natural gas or other minerals. Oil has unique financial characteristics 
that distinguish it from other types of resources, such as price inelasticity.119 
Oil’s most important distinctions from other means of wealth generation reside in 
two physical properties: oil is not produced and it is nonrenewable.120 The consequence 
is that oil exports are actually a liquidation of assets rather than a source of income; 
nonetheless, oil reliant countries treat revenues generated from oil sales as income.121 
Without converting such revenues into some form of lasting capital, the net result is a 
reduction of national wealth. 
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c. Measuring Impact 
The independent variables used to measure resource impact on economic 
performance influence conclusions about the existence of the resource curse. Several 
factors are important to keep in mind to obtain the clearest empirical understanding of 
how export revenues and rents shape a country’s government and society. 
First, examining data over the long term takes several factors into account.122 The 
oil market and oil revenues are notoriously volatile, although price booms and busts can 
last for decades. Regardless of the measurement, looking at several decades of data 
enables more comprehensive analysis instead of confusing robust or weak performance 
for market conditions. Most studies rely on World Bank GDP data, which typically 
begins in the 1960s for the majority of countries. 
What is the best method to ascertain growth? Is one variable sufficient to grasp 
the full picture? GDP is the simplest and most common way to discern how well a 
country does in a given year. Examining total output can give a general idea of how well 
this country is performing over time, but it is not perfect. Critics highlight that GDP is a 
single measure that does a poor job of accounting for the effects of innovation, quality, 
intangibles, and sustainability.123 Joseph Stiglitz and Christine Lagarde have called for 
research into a new standard, a cry echoed by other economists who argue that GDP does 
not pay “Attention to what is produced, how it’s produced or who is producing it.”124 
So far, no alternatives to GDP have come into the fore, but more choice exists 
when measuring economic impact on individuals. Like Real GDP is adjusted for 
inflation, and thus is a more precise tool over time than Nominal GDP, GDP per capita in 
terms of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) adjusts for exchange rates to provide comparable 
price ratios among countries. PPP is the best indicator of the cost of living. 
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Examining rent distribution in oil exporting countries falls along similar lines. 
Ross argues that oil income per capita, not oil exports per capita, gives the best indicator 
of how oil revenues impact governments and citizens.125 The former factors in oil prices, 
taking it a step beyond output alone. Ross admits that this measure is not perfect, but it 
remains the best available option. 
2. Causes and Impact 
Four qualities of oil revenues lie at the heart of the negative impacts of oil on 
exporters: “Their scale, source, stability, and secrecy.”126 Oil revenues can be massive, 
come from selling assets, fluctuate volatilely, and are not open to public audit. Ross 
comments that when such properties combine with poor governance and weak 
institutions, the outcome is often worse than if a country possessed no oil reserves. 
The consensus is that the curse is a political phenomenon. Ross offers three 
political causative theories: cognitive: “resource booms produce a type of short-
sightedness among policymakers”; societal: “resource exports tend to empower sectors, 
classes, or interest groups that favor growth-impeding policies”; and state-centered: 
“resource booms tend to weaken state institutions.”127 Economic explanations, and even 
the social complications, are important to consider to present a more complete picture. 
Ross offers four specific economic explanations: “A decline in the terms of trade for 
primary commodities, the instability of international commodity markets, the poor 
economic linkages between resource and non-resource sectors, and an ailment commonly 
known as the ‘Dutch Disease.’”128  
Auty identifies the oil curse with “rent cycling theory,” which asserts that states 
with low levels of rent tend to create productive economies, while high rent states do not 
undergo this process, which creates the dependency that is so common among many 
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exporters.129 Figure 11 outlines the processes whereby oil dependent states fall prey to 
this “staple trap,” which is associated with the problems and outcomes of the resource 
curse. 
 
Figure 11.  High Rent Competitive Industrialization Development Model130 
a. Political 
Luciani and Beblawi pioneered research on the rentier state in the 1980s, and 
since then this concept has joined the explanations for the curse; however, Luciani has 
since argued that this paradigm is not necessarily a de facto conduit to the oil curse.131 
More recent studies find that political factors are the true determinant of the extent to 
which resource based economies suffer from the curse. A leading explanation argues that 
the two key independent variables are levels of inclusiveness and how well a system 
coordinates and enforces its rules, defined as “intertemporal credibility.”132 Oil producers 
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fall into four types of governance structures based on these criteria, shown in Figure 12. 
Ross et al. classify KSA as a “Hegemonic Government” due to its low level of political 
inclusiveness. 
 
Figure 12.  Overall Intertemporal Credibility and Political Inclusiveness133 
Access to windfall profits shapes political behavior that prioritizes rent seeking, 
where the members of society with the means to create productive enterprises choose 
instead to focus their efforts on capturing the maximum possible share of revenue that the 
state doles out.134 The primary repercussion of this behavior is that private industry does 
not operate at its potential, decreasing GDP and leaving room for the state to occupy 
portions of the economy that it arguably could avoid. 
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Another strand of the curse’s outcomes centers on governments themselves. Many 
authors cite the lack of taxation in oil states as a direct link to an absence of 
representation, which in turn enables autocratic rule. This type of domineering 
governance combines with minimal inroads for democracy to create societies that are 
politically repressed or prone to increased rates of violent political dissent or even civil 
war.135 
Karl argues that commodity dependence shapes the state’s institutions and 
decision frameworks, and that oil booms weaken state capacity by shifting attention and 
energy to allocation rather than extraction.136 Once a bust occurs, the state is less able to 
adapt to operating with reduced resources to meet the expectations and commitments 
established when prices were high. Establishing patronage networks is politically 
expedient for ruling regimes, since they too reduce the likelihood of political dissent137; 
however, beneficiaries expect to receive benefits regardless of macroeconomic 
conditions. 
Corruption, income inequality and subjugation of women are key societal 
outcomes.138 The first two outcomes exist in conjunction with oil rents due to the 
absence of transparency.139 Ross argues that through either subsidies or Dutch Disease, 
fewer women seek work or fewer jobs exist, resulting in a low participation rate in the 
labor force, which ultimately reduces female political power.140 
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b. Economic 
Some portions of the literature cite the Dutch Disease as a cause of the curse, 
while other authors view it as an outcome. Another theoretical contributor is poor terms 
of regional and international trade. Additionally, weak connections between the enclaved 
hydrocarbon industry and the non-oil sectors restrain overall growth.141 Pro-cyclical 
fiscal and monetary policies, where spending occurs in sync with oil prices, perpetuates 
state revenue booms and busts.142 The patterns that the curse creates over time often 
translates into oil based governments having no realistic exit strategy to change the 
economy.143 
One primary economic consequence is that exporters’ growth routinely performs 
well below potential, given the possibility of returns on these countries’ natural 
capital.144 Frankel shows that growth averages have been lower for four decades in 
economies with high ratios of mineral rents to overall exports compared to a large 
number of low rent economies, shown in Figure 13. The volatile nature of oil revenue 
streams lead to unpredictable macroeconomic conditions, which creates difficulty 
managing the state’s budget. Reliance on the state leads to bloated public-sector 
employment and high overall unemployment.145 SOEs drive the economy, creating 
conditions that stunt private sector development and inhibit competitiveness.146 Public 
investment programs that have the best intentions often sprawl out of control or do not 
achieve their desired objective. 
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Figure 13.  Statistical Relationship between Exports and Growth147 
Discussion of the Dutch Disease permeates the literature. This condition is “A 
process whereby new discoveries or favorable price changes in one sector of the 
economy cause distress in other sectors.”148 Essentially high oil prices raise the real 
exchange rate, which makes non-tradable exports less competitive and leads to crowding 
out of other industries, usually agriculture or manufacturing.149 Also, since the energy 
sector is so lucrative, it pulls labor away from other industries, even though hydrocarbon 
extraction and processing is not labor intensive.150 
3. Escaping the Curse 
The general sentiment in the prescriptive literature holds that since oil can be 
either a blessing or a curse, that a remedy exists to actually harness hydrocarbon revenues 
to underpin sustainable welfare programs and development, despite the history of 
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underperformance among the aggregate of exporters.151 Karl captures the essence of the 
way forward for remedying the issue at large: “The resource curse if fundamentally a 
political problem about the efficient, transparent, and just distribution of the costs and 
benefits from the world’s most valuable commodity. As such, it requires a political 
solution. This will not be easy.”152 
a. Recommendations 
Auty proposes a “dual track” approach, where geographically separate areas act as 
test beds that implement the desired outcomes first, which allows a gradual removal of 
rents from the overall structure of society in the second phase.153 This technique allows 
elites that are accustomed to rent seeking to see the benefits of moving away from rent 
reliance, while simultaneously removing the threats to entrenched interests associated 
with reforms based on shock therapy timelines. 
Many authors hold up transparency just under panacea status in solving many of 
the problems that plague oil states. The theory is that as internal operations become open 
to scrutiny, the likelihood of continued abuses of power that lead to corruption, rent 
seeking, inequality, etc., will diminish.154 Given the centrality of transparency to 
combatting the curse, it is not surprising that while unveiling Vision 2030 MbS stressed 
the need for the Saudi oil sector to become more transparent, both to improve political, 
economic and social conditions, and also out of necessity, as Aramco’s IPO will provide 
investors access to information regarding the company’s profits and operations.155 
A popular economic recommendation centers on the idea of saving today’s oil 
generated profits via investing them in funds that generate interest that future generations 
can employ as necessary. Some authors admit that this solution is unlikely to gain any 
ground without international pressure from non-state entities on ruling elites in exporting 
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countries, hence Auty’s recommendation for a phased approach.156 When leaders choose 
to invest oil wealth, they have four options for how to employ the state’s funds: “oil in 
the ground, financial assets (e.g., foreign exchange reserves), physical assets (e.g., roads), 
and human capital (e.g., a better-educated labor force).”157 A state’s leadership should 
choose its investment mechanism based on its existing capital strengths and weaknesses. 
In a similar vein, Frankel argues that counter-cyclical fiscal policy is necessary to 
offset the harmful effects of volatility.158 Expanding expenditures during booms and 
contracting during busts only worsens the effects of these periods. Despite the example of 
some resource exporters, few countries have been able to implement this recommendation. 
One recommendation for the Saudi example that combines the benefits of counter-
cyclical policies with the power of sovereign wealth funds is modifying the PIF by 
dividing it into “A Stabilization Fund and a Savings Fund.”159 Removing resources 
devoted to current spending from overall revenues can reduce dependence on oil for the 
annual budget, thus reducing the volatility associated with current accounts.160 
b. Why Difficult  
Effective solutions exist that point the way for developing countries to mitigate 
the effects of the oil curse, yet many states continue to bear the burdens of ineffective 
resource management. The obvious implication is that these economically sound policy 
recommendations are politically difficult in practice or unattractive to the government’s 
leadership. Ignorance is not the overall culprit. In most cases, this disappointing trend 
likely stems from corruption, resistance to change, insufficient state capacity, or a 
combination of all of these factors. 
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C. THE OIL CURSE IN SAUDI ARABIA 
The government has tried to diversify the economy and reduce the role of the state 
since the 1970s.161 Many of the themes in Vision 2030 echo the priorities of the five-year 
development plans that shaped economic policy from 1970–2000. Somewhat ironically, 
the success of Vision 2030 depends on ARAMCO’s pending partial IPO, whose 
advocates are seeking investors to support future oil production while the state plans to 
divest from its historic reliance on oil revenues.162 Several aspects of the kingdom’s oil 
sector separate it from the rest of OPEC and essentially the rest of the world’s producers: 
it possesses the largest reserves, is the current swing producer, and it is the largest crude 
exporter.163 New market dynamics are changing these conditions. 
The kingdom suffers from several aspects of the oil curse, but some of the classic 
impacts do not apply to its experience. The country is ultimately better off for having 
large amounts of oil that drastically raised human development, unlike some producers in 
MENA, Africa, and South America. One method to classify oil’s impact is to group 
exporters; the Legatum Prosperity index governance and economy rankings provide a 
useful benchmark.164 Figure 14 shows the Legatum scores over time, placing Saudi 
Arabia in the oil blessing category, while its rival Iran suffers from a partial oil curse. 
Across the Red Sea, Sudan falls prey to the classic oil curse. 
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Figure 14.  Oil Curse Groupings165 
Saudi Arabia’s overall Legatum rankings dropped in the past two years. Figure 15 
shows the kingdom well beneath the index’s prosperity gap, which balances these scores 
against PPP. This decline is primarily the result of the weaker macroeconomic 
environment associated with the period of reduced oil prices that began in 2014. The 
trend also reinforces the notion that even though oil has been an overall blessing, the 
dominance of rents and patronage on the Saudi system also created dependency and 
many complications. Repeated patterns of volatile economic performance produced 
sustained periods of weak growth, accompanied by steady state political conditions. The 
implication is that the existing model that developed since the first oil boom in 1973–74 
is not sustainable without improved governance.166 This dynamic supports the overall 
resource curse perspective that governance lies at the heart of the problem, even if a 
country does not fully experience all of the impacts of the curse. 
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Figure 15.  The Prosperity Gap167 
1. Political 
Some generalized rentier theories do not neatly fit into the Saudi experience once 
the level of analysis goes deeper than the state as a unitary actor. Hertog states “When 
Terry Lynn Karl argues that rentier states lack connections to their citizens, she seems to 
conflate macro, meso and micro.”168 Gause argues that Karl’s claim that booms weaken 
petro-states fits the history of many countries but does not apply to Saudi Arabia.169 His 
justification is that the Saudi state is able to effectively govern its society and the land 
within its borders, citing its capable ministries. The second part of this opinion is that 
political dissent in the kingdom occurred when oil prices were high, not low. Okruhlik’s 
findings support Gause, as “Windfall profits of petroleum exports do not translate into a 
politically quiescent population.”170 The notion that political opinions have risen to the 
surface in the kingdom despite high rents, lack of representation, and even extremely low 
government tolerance for public political expression calls into question the standard view 
of rentierism in Saudi society. 
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a. Governance and Capacity 
The World Bank’s governance index evaluates countries by six criteria. Figure 16 
show that Saudi Arabia scores well on four of these, while its political stability is 
unimpressive and its voice is one of the world’s lowest. Comparing the kingdom’s 
governance scores to South Korea and China gives context. While the political systems in 
these three countries are very different, China and South Korea sustained world class 
average GDP growth over the last four decades. South Korea significantly outperforms 
both Saudi Arabia and China on all six topics. Saudi Arabia scores better than China in 
four categories, while China does better than KSA in government effectiveness; voice 
and accountability is a tie.171 The inference is that governance has a direct impact on 
economic growth, but growth is ultimately the product of multiple factors. Figure 17 
indicates that GCC regulatory quality is substandard compared to these oil states’ 
economic performance. While regulatory quality is only one measure of overall 
governance, Saudi Arabia’s average global score shows that it lags behind its Gulf 
neighbors, which highlights the lack of political reform that has accompanied previous 
attempts to modify the structure of the economy. 
 
Figure 16.  KSA Governance Indicators172 
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Figure 17.  GCC Regulatory Quality in International Comparison173 
Another way to separate oil producers is by rents per capita. Elbadawi argues that 
$2,000 is the threshold that qualifies a country as having high rents per capita, which 
separates those that suffer from many of the social aspects of the resource curse, in 
addition to some of the political problems, noted in Figure 18. He notes that Libya is the 
outlier to this trend. Compared to the rest of MENA, Saudi Arabia’s location within the 
RRLP group is more politically stable and relatively economically sound compared to the 
RPLA countries, and even RRLA states. The kingdom provides support to several of the 
region’s poorest members and to allies at risk from internal strife. Cammett notes, “While 
it is hard to believe that Saudi or UAE citizens would be richer in the absence of oil, it is 
more plausible to think that Iraq (or Nigeria) could have been better off without it.”174 
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Figure 18.  Resource Rents per Capita across Countries175 
b. Outcomes 
Saudi Arabia is by design one of the world’s opaquest countries. Despite 
providing little insight into political calculus or Aramco’s revenue streams, the kingdom 
is 62nd on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions index.176 This rank is 
lower than in previous years, although this is due to improvements that other countries 
made. Nonetheless, one would expect a much lower rank due to the association of rentier 
states with corruption. Other oil exporters fall much farther down the list, with Mexico 
coming in at 123rd, Iran at 131st, and Venezuela at 166th. Income inequality is 
problematic. Figure 19 outlines the likely flow of oil revenues through the government. 
The government has decided that they are willing to open up such details following 
Aramco’s IPO to acquire cash and support diversification; it is unclear if similar types of 
information will become public knowledge in the effort to promote transparency. 
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Figure 19.  Possible Money Flows in Saudi Oil Transactions, 2010177 
 Despite the vast wealth available within the country, many citizens struggle to 
afford housing and millions of people live below the poverty line.178 Women’s equality is 
quite low, with the infamous driving ban still in effect; however, more Saudi women now 
graduate from universities than men.179 Vision 2030 needs to create opportunities for the 
poor, youth, and women to manage expectations of these large, marginalized portions of 
the population. 
Oil has greatly benefited the country in several important ways. Saudi scores on 
the UN’s Human Development Index rose over the last 25 years, shown in Figure 20, 
improving the quality of life for the average citizen. Similarly, oil wealth enabled 
significant physical and critical infrastructure modernization. Political violence does 
exist, although the country is immensely more stable than many other MENA states. 
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Figure 20.  Trends in Saudi Arabia’s HDI Component Indices’ Values180 
2. Economic 
Saudi Arabia is a high-income country, since its GNI per capita exceeds 
$12,236.181  The Heritage Foundation’s Economic Freedom index classifies the kingdom 
as an emerging economy that is moderately free, ranking it 64th globally, just above the 
MENA and world averages.182 Per the Heritage perspective, trade freedom and tax policy 
are current strengths, while government integrity, investment freedom, and financial 
freedom are problems. 
a. Growth Theory 
The neo-classical growth theory asserts that growth is a function of its inputs: 
capital, labor, and total factor productivity (TFP), which reflects efficiency.183 Since the 
energy sector that dominates the Saudi economy is capital intensive and does not create 
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many jobs, the positive growth stabilization patterns that are needed to successfully 
diversify the economy away from oil must increase the role of TFP and labor.184 TFP 
rates hover essentially at zero, which is problematic, yet also an opportunity that the 
country can and must seize. While human capital improvements are taking root, increases 
of capital and labor to overall output are not likely.185 The World Bank’s Growth 
Report’s examination of the 13 economies that grew at seven percent or greater after 
World War II until 2000 finds that governments must pay attention to 16 areas of 
governance and economic policy to create competitive growth environments.186 While 
there is no magic recipe that universally guarantees growth, Saudi economic policy 
matches several of the report’s “bad ideas,” specifically subsidizing energy, using the 
public sector to combat unemployment, and inhibiting competition for chosen economic 
sectors, (i.e., construction or downstream oil production in the Saudi case).187 
Three broad policies dominated the Middle East in the latter half of the 20th 
century, prior to 21st century attempts to center the regions’ economies on exports.188 
Saudi Arabia’s economic history generally follows these trends. State led development 
shaped the 1970s, while Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) dominated 
development strategies in the 1980s as Middle Eastern states strove to catch up with the 
industrialized world. The approach failed, earning this time period the title of the “Lost 
Decade.”189 The 1990s brought structural adjustment in an attempt to rectify the fiscal 
damage done in the 1980s. Cammett notes that the painful process did resolve many of 
the restraints on growth, although some problems persist. 
Rostow pioneered growth stage theory to examine how changes to an economy’s 
composition over time resulted in its transition to improved performance and ultimately 
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high-income status.190 More recent constructions founded on this notion argue that 
growth occurs in three stages: “factor-driven, investment-driven, and innovation-
driven.”191 Bremer and Kasarda expound on this concept to create three development 
phases shown in Figure 21: First, Middle, and Advanced. Saudi Arabia’s lack of 
diversification and associated rent seeking has kept them at the beginning of the First 
phase. Per this theory, if the kingdom can incorporate the manufacturing programs 
outlined in the NTP the country will move into the Middle phase. Improving governance 
must go hand in hand with existing Saudi efforts to create a knowledge based economy in 
order to push into the Advanced phase. 
 
Figure 21.  Bremer/Kasarda Stage Theory192 
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b. KSA’s Performance 
Saudi Arabia’s volatile GDP growth and GDP per capita growth since the late 
1970s has typically fluctuated between 0 percent and 10 percent, although the oil booms 
and busts in the 1970s and 1980s created dramatic rises and falls in GDP, shown in 
Figures 22 and 23. Current accounts also reflect international oil prices, as evidenced by 
drops in 2009 and 2014 per Figure 24. Convergence theory argues that incomes of 
citizens in developing countries should catch up to those of the developed world over 
time, but this has not been Saudi Arabia’s experience.193 Many studies are quick to point 
out that Saudi GDP per capita remains essentially unchanged from the levels of income in 
1970, which highlights the underperformance that the oil curse literature assigns to oil 
producers.194 
 
Year on year percent change 
Figure 22.  Real GDP Growth195 
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Figure 23.  GDP per Capita Growth196 
 
Percent GDP 
Figure 24.  Current Account and Financial Account Balance197 
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GDP per capita in terms of PPP in 2015 was just over $50,000.198 This amount is 
approximately $2,500 less than PPP in the United Sates and $3,000 less than Hong Kong 
per Figure 25. This dynamic shows the impacts of low oil prices in the 1990s and higher 
prices after 2002 on individual citizens. Some argue that the lack of income convergence 
is a result of policies that tie the non-oil sector to government spending, which ultimately 
means that oil prices pervade all economic activity.199 
 
Constant 2011 international $ 
Figure 25.  GDP per Capita, PPP200 
 
                                                 
198 “GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2011 international $),” The World Bank, Accessed August 22, 
2017, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KD?end=2015&locations=SA&start=1968&view=chart.   
199 Al-Sadiq, “Economic Convergence in Saudi Arabia,” 157. 
200 Source: “GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2011 international $),” The World Bank, Accessed 
August 22, 2017, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KD?contextual=default&end=2015&locations=SA-HK-US&start=1990&view=chart. 
 59 
The impacts of Dutch Disease are mixed. Manufacturing existed at the time of the 
first oil boom, but production primarily supported ISI.201 So the oil curse did not crowd 
out manufacturing and agriculture sectors per se. Manufacturing has grown, albeit more 
in oil-related industries than non-oil. The lack of diversification outside of the energy 
sector since their establishment is influenced by the dominance of the oil sector. 
Agriculture exports have essentially been a failure.202 This outcome is mainly due to a 
lack of comparative advantage. Most of Saudi Arabia is not a naturally suitable 
environment to grow wheat or raise dairy cattle. The government pegged the Saudi Riyal 
to the dollar almost 30 years ago, maintaining a 3.75 SR:1 USD ratio; despite the benefits 
of doing so, the riyal’s value increased 17 percent since 2014.203 
D. KSA’S ESCAPE ATTEMPTS 
Economic modernization efforts across the GCC at large tend to fit into a 
common development model that rests on three primary pillars: “Hydrocarbon value 
added and energy intensive processing, logistics/services, and financial investments/
services.”204 Saudi Arabia is a leader in energy related manufacturing. SABIC is the 
world’s second largest chemical producer. Initiatives designed to create a robust financial 
sector have yet to materialize, highlighted by King Abdullah Financial District’s (KAFD) 
lackluster ability to attract international financial institutions.205 Vision 2030 aspires to 
shift commercial maritime traffic flows into new port facilities, but major changes must 
occur before King Abdullah Port can rival Jebel Ali in Dubai. 
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The history of reform programs in Saudi Arabia dates to the 1960s,206 but 
traditionally such efforts did not tackle core problems,207 since “‘Doing very little’ is the 
bane of all Saudi reform efforts.”208 This inefficiency stems partly from limited capacity 
for change that patronage imposes on the social construct, and also from the desire of 
elites to implement change slowly in order to manage the process and maintain their 
positions of power, authority, and wealth.209 
Beginning in 1970, five-year development plans guided the budget for 
infrastructure, education, public services, labor policies, etc.210 The plans were effective 
at allocating the physical capital needed to modernize the country’s infrastructure. These 
initiatives were the mechanism through which the state improved standards of living that 
lead all geographic regions of the developing world. Many of the development plans 
initiated the diversification and privatization efforts found in Vision 2030 in the 1990s, 
with particular attention given to the economic cities and downstream petrochemical 
production. Some efforts were made to move the engines of the economy away from the 
state, (e.g., making SABIC a public private partnership that is 70 percent state held). 
While achieving moderate success, these efforts did not take root on the whole. 
1. Policies 
Reduction of the country’s reliance on oil revenues centers on diversifying the 
economy into other productive sectors, privatizing state-owned activity and public 
support to reduce the state’s fiscal burden, and creating jobs in the private sector for 
Saudi citizens in order to support the privatization effort and to reduce high levels of 
unemployment. 
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a. Comparison to Washington Consensus 
While Gulf diversification efforts have taken much advice from international 
financial institutions (IFI) and consultant firms whose views range from pragmatic to 
neoliberal, GCC members have ultimately crafted their own version of macroeconomic 
policy, shown in Table 1. Similarities exist in promoting conservative fiscal policies and 
trade that is more or less classified as free. Luciani argues that the differences with the 
Washington Consensus have reduced Dutch Disease effects, yet enabled the reliance on 
cheap, imported labor that has produced the national labor market distortions and 
associated unemployment that currently have no real end in sight.211 
Table 1.   Diverging Consensuses212 
 
b. Diversification  
Figure 26 shows that despite repeated initiatives to diversify the economy over the 
past four decades, the Saudi economy is the least diversified within the GCC. Wages in 
non-oil sectors pale in comparison to the hydrocarbon sector; however, despite the oil’s 
massive contribution to the overall economy, Saudi non-oil industries are growing.213  
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Figure 26.  Degree of Diversification in the GCC214 
Hans-Georg Mueller notes that “The scope for continued manufacturing 
diversification and productivity gains is determined to a large extent by the ability of the 
industrial sector to permanently restructure itself and shift resources from traditional, less 
productive sub-sectors to the technologically more advanced and more productive 
sectors.”215 Reliance on cheap foreign labor as a technological substitute harms 
innovation that is needed to expand the range of Saudi industries.216 
Ali Aissaoui posits five policies that would optimize diversification efforts in 
Saudi Arabia: “Creating and maintaining a favorable and stable investment climate for 
enterprises; accelerating reforms of the educational and vocational training systems; 
providing an incentive structure that encourages competition and discourages rent-
seeking behavior; integrating into the regional and global markets; and avoiding the 
detrimental effect of competition among the GCC countries.”217 Many opinions of 
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diversification attempts view these efforts as woefully unsuccessful.218 Others see 
existing programs as proof that diversification is taking root.219 
c. Privatization: Competitiveness 
A primary distinction that must be made regarding the private sector in Saudi 
Arabia versus other countries is the role of the state within the private sector. The state 
needs to be involved to support the private sector’s shift to export oriented production, 
yet it also needs to pull back from its previous levels of direct involvement in productive 
capacity. Chaudhry represents the view that individuals at the top of the private sector are 
tied to the state, and even constrained its development, thus implying that the private 
sector is not truly private.220 On the other hand, Luciani represents the opinion that the 
private sector has grown more autonomous over time.221 Hertog’s analysis finds that 
policy decisions that govern the private sector are divided into “fiefdoms.”222 National 
ties to the private sector are segmented, which inhibits the overall efficiency of 
privatization by only partially implementing reforms in the sections of the bureaucracy 
whose leadership desires change.223 
The state has aimed to reduce its role in the economy for several decades. While 
this action is needed, the perceived societal benefits and actual outcomes may differ 
depending on how this process plays out. Additionally, many of the industries where the 
government is planning to promote growth depend on the state’s competitive advantage 
in cheap energy. Reliance on state supported, low cost feedstock in several sectors will 
keep the government directly involved in the private sector, thus eroding true 
privatization. 
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Reducing the state’s role in the economy via privatization is often touted as a 
necessary condition to improving fiscal sustainability. There is no question that some 
aspects of the Saudi economy need to move to the private sector, yet Figure 27 shows 
that after a closer look, privatization in and of itself may not necessarily solve all the 
problems that economists advertise. 
Saudi Arabia benefits from the effective management of several of its key SOEs, 
but such success and profitability may create hesitation to let go of less well-run state 
corporations that would benefit from increased competition in the private sector. Hertog 
notes that SABIC and ARAMCO are among the GCC’s “islands of efficiency,” defying 
the global trend where state run corporations become bloated, inefficient, and even 
unprofitable.224 
 
Figure 27.  Barriers to Effective Privatization in GCC States225 
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Three initiatives comprise the government’s most significant initiatives to 
diversify, privatize, and re-employ citizens. Development of economic cities in 
conjunction with associated industrial parks specific to product clusters seeks to expand 
the range of manufacturing and to grow the number of business operating in the country. 
Selling off portions of SOEs allows the government to reduce its operating costs while 
retaining influence over the economy. Moving citizens from state to private employment 
is designed to reduce the state’s fiscal burdens and create badly needed jobs.  
a. Economic Cities and Industrial Clusters 
Saudi leadership has placed significant amounts of financial and political capital 
into a new government agency, the National Industrial Cluster Development Program, in 
conjunction with economic, industrial, and educational cities.226 The cluster program is 
the manifestation of an industrialization policy that strives to maximize comparative 
advantage and resource availability, specifically access to petroleum products and cheap 
energy. The clusters will complement existing downstream production capacity.227 The 
five chosen export sectors that comprise the program are automotive production, minerals 
and metal processing, solar energy, pharmaceuticals and biotechnology, and plastics and 
packaging.228 
The cities initiative has been in place since 1975, when the government 
established the Royal Commission for Jubail and Yanbu (RCJY) to lead the country’s 
petrochemical efforts.229 Since then the concept has taken root, as today there are 
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approximately a dozen industrial cities throughout the country, plus several research and 
development cities, education cities, and economic cities. KAFD outside Riyadh has an 
unproductive track record to date, while the massively ambitious King Abdullah 
Economic City (KAEC), located 150 km north of Jeddah, is marketed as a capstone 
project that will encompass all aspects of the new industrial export program.230 
One example of an initiative that intersects the privatization effort with economic 
diversification goals is the integration of solar energy into the national electrical grid. 
Vision 2030 calls for 9.5 GW of renewable energy by the year, an update to an earlier 
plan developed at King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy (KA-CARE) 
that aimed to develop 41 GW of solar based electricity.231 The incorporation of solar 
energy into electricity production is important to reduce domestic oil consumption, which 
costs the government approximately $70 billion annually in lost exports and threatens to 
consume all exports by  due to projected rises in commercial and residential use.232 
b. Public Private Partnerships (PPP) 
The first experiment in partial privatization was selling 30 percent of SABIC in 
1984, with approximately a dozen similar ventures taking shape since.233 SABIC’s 
success within the petrochemical industry is quite impressive, with total output that is 
second globally behind DOW Chemical.234 SABIC and ARAMCO are both very well 
managed, while other SOEs are inefficient drags on the economy. A key question moving 
forward is how ARMACO will restructure itself following its 2018 IPO. If it can actually 
become an energy company, or perhaps an even broader holding company, its potential to 
drive growth is substantial. 
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c. Saudization 
Since the 1990s the government has tried to create more jobs for its citizens 
outside of state employment via top down regulations.235 This is one of the most 
important areas for the state to manage, because, “Unless state policy can ensure that 
Saudi citizens gain employment within the burgeoning private sector, on a basis where it 
is economically beneficial for employers to provide them with this employment, 
successful industrialization could well be socially disruptive.”236 Shifting private sector 
jobs to private citizens will enable Saudis themselves to drive the economy, while 
simultaneously reducing the state’s fiscal burdens. Despite the importance of making jobs 
for citizens, especially for youth and women, Saudization has not achieved its targets. 
The government implemented several programs designed to force private sector 
businesses to hire citizens, (e.g., the Nitaqat initiative in 2011).237 The overall effort to 
employ citizens outside the government’s payroll notionally began in the 1940s, but the 
modern push to change labor market dynamics began during the fourth development plan 
in the mid 1980s.238 The approach is a top down directive that has three key 
characteristics: quotas, job reservations, and training subsidies.239 The policies have 
become more top down instead of market driven and do nothing to reduce wages to make 
Saudi labor more financially attractive to employers. The end result is often that 
companies find workarounds to skirt regulations or, in extreme cases, relocate to 
neighboring countries with more attractive labor policies.240 
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E. SUMMARY 
Oil shaped modern Saudi Arabia and will continue to play a major role in the 
country’s future. The oil curse has partially manifested itself in the kingdom’s politics, 
economy, and society. Large, opaque oil revenues furnished the monarchy with the 
ability to form patronage networks that enabled them to rule with a tight grasp on power. 
Rent seeking does occur, shaping political activities and impacting institutional quality. 
Average GDP growth is unimpressive given the size of the country’s oil reserves. 
Economic inequality is a significant problem, and additional steps toward democracy are 
currently beyond citizens’ reach. At the same time, oil revenues significantly raised living 
standards and enabled the establishment of other industries. Success stories include 
SABIC, while agriculture policies were incredibly inefficient. 
Aspects of the curse, such as Dutch disease, are problematic in that oil has made 
other industries reliant on oil performance. That being said, other industries would not 
likely have come into existence without large oil revenues. The lack of transparency in 
the government has political and social ramifications that resemble some claims of the 
curse, such as female subjugation. Civil war and political upheaval is absent, unlike many 
countries that fall under the full oil curse. 
The kingdom is ultimately better off with oil, but it cannot afford to remain 
dependent on crude exports in the future for a variety of economic reasons. Oil reliance 
created the labor market problems that the government desperately wants to rectify. The 
economy must create an adequate number and the right type of jobs for its young people 
if it has any hope of making this change. New approaches are needed to make a local 
labor force that can compete on the world stage. 
The partial presence of the oil curse in KSA is sufficient to make the economy 
struggle to make meaningful economic changes so long as existing governance models 
remain in place. MbS’ succession increases the likelihood that reform initiatives will 
continue to receive support, but does the new power dynamic indicate that a benevolent 
autocracy will emerge if and when MbS becomes king? Saudi approaches to fixing the 
economy stem from the position of retaining government control of industries or bringing 
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glory to the ruling family. Such attempts have not stemmed from a meaningful campaign 
to reduce the oil curse because the underlying political conditions persist. Economic 
reform cannot occur in isolation. 
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IV. MARKET INEFFICIENCIES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The ability to switch the Saudi economy to a new model depends on how well it 
can compete in international markets outside of the oil sector. Even if sufficient political 
change occurs to meet the goals in Vision 2030’s programs, the private sector has to be 
able to sell its products to flourish. Two of the most important underlying factors that 
determine competitiveness are the quality of the business environment and human capital. 
Opportunities exist for the government to change the conditions that shape how 
Saudi firms hire employees, whom they employ, how students’ education prepares them 
for their careers, and how citizens view private sector employment. An example of 
improving institutional quality is a set of new regulations that are making FDI a more 
streamlined process.241 Nonetheless, if the state does not seize these opportunities, old 
habits will endure and remain stumbling blocks to competitive progress.  
Institutional support for private growth requires expansion. In most industrialized 
states, the private sector can flourish because it is built upon a foundation that ensures 
favorable conditions. Such systems protect property rights, enforce contracts, enable 
fairness for competition, provide access to credit, ensure bankruptcy policies exist, etc. 
The government is striving to increase confidence in such conditions by sending its 
ministers to promote the country.242 Saudi citizens and foreign investors currently have 
cause for hesitation in growing a business, taking risk or placing capital in the private 
sector, since opinions vary on the quality of the kingdom’s objective, rule based 
processes. 
Many Saudi university graduates trained to work in the public sector since the 
bureaucracy is the employer of choice. Existing education curricula and job preparation 
                                                 
241 Michael Quigley, “SAGIA Simplifies FDI Process,” Blakes Business Class, November 6, 2015, 
http://www.blakesbusinessclass.com/sagia-simplifies-fdi-process/; “Saudi Arabia - 1-Openness to and 
Restriction on Foreign Investment,” International Trade Administration, July 19, 2017, 
https://www.export.gov/article?id=Saudi-Arabia-openness-to-foreign-investment.  
242 World Economic Forum, “Davos 2017 - Saudi Arabia Vision 2030,” YouTube video, World 
Economic Forum, January 19, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ef8fjnTFGGo. 
 72 
programs are insufficient to produce an internationally competitive total workforce.243 
Top tier employees with experience at the hallmark public companies, (e.g., Aramco), are 
prepared to lead in private industry, but the majority of Saudi labor is calibrated to 
operate within the confines of state employment. Private sector revenues cannot replace 
those from the public sector overnight since the required workforce is not ready. 
Women and youth comprise huge percentages of the population that is 
unemployed. Females make up just under half of the total population, while 45 percent of 
Saudis are under the age of 25 and 55 percent are under the age of 30.244 Approximately 
a third of women do not work, while unemployment of 15–24 years olds hovers around 
30 percent.245 These groups represent untapped and essential resources to replace 
expatriate workers. Philosophically, ushering women into the workforce represents a 
change in Saudi identity, as does moving youth out of state subsidized lifestyles, whether 
via public sector jobs or unemployment benefits. The upcoming generation of Saudi 
workers will define its identity and priorities based on its impressions of Vision 2030. 
B. BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 
The dynamics of Saudi Arabia’s business environment and the quality of its 
institutions profoundly shape the range of options that policy makers have in their efforts 
to diversify and privatize the economy. While debates over appropriate levels of state 
intervention in an economy will endure in the political economy field, there is no 
question that the conditions that a government creates bear direct consequences on 
businesses. Since the Saudi state is an active participant in the country’s mixed economy, 
its decisions carry more weight compared to capitalist systems. 
Competitiveness is the summation of how well an economy fares on “Internal 
markets, external price, external cost, and measures of competitiveness based on growth 
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fundamentals.”246 Saudi Arabia ranks 29th on the WEF’s Global Competitiveness Index, 
outperforming the MENA average in every subcomponent of the economy, noted in 
Figure 28. The Competitive Index’s first four pillars in blue are “basic requirements,” 
while the next five pillars in green are “efficiency enhancers,” and the last two pillars in 
red are “innovation and sophistication factors.” Notable current weaknesses are the 
macroeconomic environment and labor market efficiency, with sub-index ranks of 68 and 
65, while financial market development, higher education and training, business 
sophistication, and innovation are areas currently underdeveloped but primed for growth. 
The Competitiveness Index paints the rosiest picture of Saudi Arabia of all the studies 
cited in this paper. The WEF argues that diversification requires more sophisticated 
production and services, which entails workers who are employed more efficiently and 
with stronger STEM and management capacity.247 
 
Figure 28.  MENA Competitiveness Index248 
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1. Doing Business 
Saudi Arabia ranks 94th of 190 countries on the World Bank’s 2017 Doing 
Business index, up two positions from 2016.249 This rank is well below UAE’s position 
of 26th, and even Bahrain at 63rd, Oman at 66th, and Qatar at 83rd. The Saudi score of 
61.11 is above the MENA score of 56.36 and Kuwait’s rank of 102. Four subcategories 
are quite poor: starting a business, enforcing contracts, trade across borders, and 
resolving insolvency, per Figure 29. The low quality of enforcing contracts does not bode 
well for property rights. Resolving insolvency scores zero due to the current absence of 
bankruptcy laws, although Minister of Commerce and Investment al-Qasabi stated in 
April 2017 that this law will be signed later this year.250 
Despite poor performance in four categories, ranks for the index’s other six 
categories are positive, although none are stellar. The kingdom has the region’s largest 
economy, but nearly half of the requirements necessary to participate in it are obstructive. 
The obvious implication is that the government needs to create better conditions if it truly 
desires to promote privatization. 
 
Scale: Rank 190 Center, Rank 1 outer edge 
Figure 29.  Rankings on Doing Business Topics—Saudi Arabia251 
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Also from the Doing Business report are the factors that domestic business 
owners cite as their main problems, shown in Figure 30. “Restrictive labor regulations” 
and “Inadequately educated workforce” come out as the leading impediments from the 
managerial perspective, sentiments that echo the position of the Competitiveness Index. 
Corruption and employee work ethic are two often cited weaknesses of the Saudi system 
in the policy literature, yet these issues actually appear less problematic.252 
 
Figure 30.  Most Problematic Factors for Doing Business253 
a. Efficiency 
Total Factor Productivity (TFP), which measures efficiency of labor and capital, 
averaged 1.3 percent of overall non-oil growth from 2000–08 and 0.2 percent from 2009–
15, highlighted in Figure 31. Substituting cheap labor for innovation and efficiency, plus 
high rates of capital, is a hallmark of the Gulf development model. Inefficiency has 
hampered growth and will continue to do so regardless of other reforms.254 
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Figure 31.  Growth Decomposition255 
An example of how the institutional and business environments impact the 
country’s ability to expand the private sector and to increase efficiency is the status of 
entrepreneurship. The Global Innovation index, which examines innovation input and 
output, ranks the kingdom 55th out of 127 countries.256 Creating the right environment is 
simply the beginning of fostering an entrepreneurial spirit. Education and skilled labor 
are essential, but so is connectivity with the global market of ideas. Small and Medium 
Enterprises (SME) can drive private productivity from the ground up, but not under 
current conditions.257 A “dual-track development strategy” that supports large firms and 
SMEs is an example of how the state can support the private sector to promote 
privatization.258 
                                                 
255 Source: IMF Staff, “Saudi Arabia: Selected Issues,” International Monetary Fund, October 13, 
2016, 59, http://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2016/12/31/Saudi-Arabia-Selected-Issues-44329.  
256 Cornell INSEAD WIPO, “Saudi Arabia Profile,” Global Innovation Index 2017, 
https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-economy.  
257 Robert Looney, “Development Strategies for Saudi Arabia: Escaping the Rentier State Syndrome,” 
Strategic Insights 3, no. 3 (March 2004), 1–5, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=444733. 
258 Ibid. 
 77 
b. Institutional Quality 
Several of the indices above and in Chapter III highlight that Saudi Arabia’s 
institutional environment is a mixed picture, with poor performance in multiple areas, but 
also some surprises, (e.g., corruption). Rentier states often earn negative association with 
high levels of corruption, stemming from substandard rule of law, transparency, or 
property rights.259 The narrative then assigns associated results such as income 
inequality, poor conditions to conduct business, or an inhospitable foreign investment 
climate. The scores of Saudi institutions that affect the business environment underpin 
the arguments presented in Chapter II that claim that Saudi Arabia does not fit all aspects 
of the stereotypical rentier state. 
2. Industrial Constraints 
Diversification in Saudi Arabia so far is a somewhat misleading term, given that 
industries used to replace crude oil exports still revolve around energy commodities 
themselves, (e.g., petrochemicals), or benefit from the region’s competitive advantage of 
access to cheap feedstock or electricity.260 The region’s banks have become adept at 
financing petrochemical industrialization projects, and local stock markets are playing an 
increasing role in this process, but the cost of many of the newer initiatives is so large 
that individual institutions cannot fund such ventures on their own.261 Luciani finds that 
industries that rely on large quantities of cheap electricity, (e.g., aluminum production), 
will prove more burdensome than downstream industries that simply rely on access to 
cheap oil and gas feedstock.262 
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a. Intra-GCC Competition 
Many of the industries targeted to support diversification exist in other Gulf 
countries, so intra-GCC competition is a concern for the kingdom.263 Opportunities to 
cooperate exist, for example integrating gas infrastructure, but little ground has been 
made. Plans to expand the Saudi transportation sector is an example of how hopes for the 
future can run into well-established operations, such as Dubai World. Growth industries 
for the GCC at large, specifically nuclear power, are already showing signs of 
progression with minimum coordination across international lines, seemingly creating a 
leadership contest between Saudi Arabia and the UAE in the same way that they have 
fought to represent the GCC common market.264 
b. Industrialization Window 
Saudi non-petrochemical manufacturing predominately consists of basic materials 
and food processing.265 Efforts to increase TFP need to coincide with improvements in 
the sophistication of manufacturing. The country’s leadership ultimately desires to create 
a knowledge economy, although attaining this ambition is farther off in the future than 
the ministers and MbS wish to admit.  
Central to improvements in manufacturing is discovering where to find slack in 
the global economy. China will not be the world’s factory forever as it is moves toward 
becoming a service economy. The question is whether or not the Saudi economy can 
absorb higher quality manufacturing before emerging competitors, (e.g., India), establish 
market share dominance. 
C. HUMAN CAPITAL 
The kingdom ranks 87th out of 130 countries on the World Economic Forum’s 
Human Capital Index.266 KSA ranks 9th of 15 within MENA and at the bottom of the 
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high-income countries on this list. Saudi youth aged 15–24 perform the best of any age 
bracket in the country. This group is internationally uncompetitive in the index’s sub-
categories of vocational enrollment rate, labor force participation rate, and unemployment 
rate, although they did score well on long-term unemployment rate and skill diversity. 
1. Insufficient Skills 
Saudi Arabia succeeds at providing nearly universal primary and secondary 
schooling, but it does an average job turning the education of its population into an 
employed labor force, per Figure 32. Irrespective of education type and quality, which are 
the primary areas that need attention in the Saudi education system, the chart indicates 
that Saudi citizens generate squarely middle of the road scores for maximizing their 
education. 
 
Figure 32.  Education and Employment267 
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The quality of the workforce has been an issue that has impacted the transition of 
citizens en masse to the private sector. Literacy and education enrollment rates are 
actually quite high, and surprisingly more women now graduate from college than 
men.268 Modern academic institutions like King Abdullah University of Science and 
Technology (KAUST) are paving the way to the knowledge economy. The country has 
two education ministries, with primary and tertiary systems managed separately. 
Ironically, the country needs more skilled students who are prepared to competitively 
drive private sector growth while simultaneously needing private sector workers to fill 
blue collar positions. The income level per capita compared to the Human Capital index 
scores shows that Saudi workers are not living up to their potential, noted in Figure 33. 
 
Figure 33.  GNI Per Capita and Human Capital Index 2016269 
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2. Labor Force Integration 
Saudi citizens must join the private sector in record numbers for any of the 
ambitious plans to work. Several factors hamper creating the right type and number of 
jobs, which is arguably the most critical task facing the country. The failure to put 
citizens in manufacturing positions in the 1980s still hurts the economy, while formal 
requirements imposed on businesses that are designed to employ citizens have had little 
success because such initiatives are ultimately bad for business. 
a. Demographic Dividend 
Unlike the East Asian Tigers, Saudi Arabia and the GCC at large did not 
capitalize on its demographic dividend during the lost decade during the late 1980s.270 
This dividend describes the scenario in Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan where 
the growth of the labor force outpaced overall population growth, increasing GDP per 
capita. Cammett notes that population rise across MENA coincided with economic 
downturns, creating an underlying problem that has complicated job creation efforts for 
the past several decades and will continue to retard job growth for young Saudis. Khalid 
al Falih, Minister of Energy, Industry, and Mineral Resources, stated in various 
interviews that the government views the massive increase in young people entering the 
workforce as an asset that can interject energy and a new attitude into how the country 
conducts business.271 Such optimism seems more of a political sales pitch geared to 
attract foreign investors than genuine belief, since the western literature almost 
unanimously views the youth bulge as a contributor to unemployment and a liability for 
the state that is poised to threaten the existing system. 
b. Saudization 
Saudization policies comprise efforts to force companies to hire locally, to restrict 
hiring foreigners in certain industries, and to subsidize training and initial employment. 
These attempts have struggled due to the labor price differences between Saudi and 
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foreign workers.272 More recent efforts to encourage individuals to work in the private 
sector are more promising than quotas and restrictions imposed on businesses in the past. 
Creating unemployment insurance for private sector employees is one example.273 This 
points to the change that needs to occur in the social safety net, chiefly that the state will 
provide higher quality support to citizens who work. This will be a difficult sell, given 
the short-lived experiment of subsidy reductions in 2017 that the government restored 
within months. The low number of jobs created by previous Saudization programs clearly 
shows that the government must make some innovative and tough choices to get better 
results. 
c. Youth 
Job creation for young people who are entering the workforce is one of the most 
important tasks facing the economy’s leadership. The royally mandated pay cuts in 2016 
indicate that public sector is essentially operating at maximum labor capacity.274 The old 
process of sending the upcoming generation to college in order to groom bureaucrats is 
no longer a guaranteed option for the individual nor a desirable path for the state. Another 
key issue related to youth employment is simply creating enough jobs. The rate of 
citizens coming of age into the labor market every year is outpacing the number of new 
jobs that the economy can create, while simultaneously the focus on seniority instead of 
capability as the path to promotion discourages young people from fully investing their 
talents in Saudi firms.275 This disparity will increase the youth unemployment rate 
beyond the current rate of approximately 20 percent.  
d. Women 
Continuation of female employment patterns will perpetuate missed opportunities 
to increase output and TFP, and to reduce unemployed Saudis. Women are just under half 
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of the population, and since more women graduate from universities than men, a huge 
portion of the type of people that the government is trying to push into the private sector 
lies underutilized. The NTP cannot succeed if women remain on the labor market fringes. 
D. COMPOUNDING FACTORS 
Several current dynamics play a complicating role in reform efforts moving 
forward. The amount of time that the country’s progressive forces have at their disposal 
is running up against rising youth unemployment and the state’s decreasing capacity to 
support its citizens. In the energy market, the Saudis’ decades-long position of swing 
producer is under threat from the U.S. shale revolution. While this comparative 
advantage based on low oil extraction costs diminishes, existing rates of domestic oil 
consumption and concerns over peak demand in the future threaten the oil sector’s ability 
to generate established revenue levels moving forward. 
1. Limited Time 
As Lippman aptly notes, one of the most important considerations that the Saudis 
face is “Whether they have the time to make the economy self-sustaining and sufficiently 
expansive before the country is overwhelmed by its population growth.”276 The paradox 
is that while the time remaining to reform the country’s weaker economic and 
governance aspects is shrinking due to demographics and new dynamics in the 
international energy market, change must also occur at a rate that society can manage in 
order to actually create a meaningful impact and to prevent political discord. Rushing 
headfirst into modernization programs that the conservative populace does not support or 
that appear to stem from foreign influence are unlikely to succeed.277 The monarchy’s 
necessity for maintaining governance that supports the established social contract is one 
reason why “This authoritarian and centralized state struggle[d] so much with imposing 
regulatory change on bureaucracy and business.”278 
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2. Redistribution’s Threats 
The government’s ability to fund all of the aspects of the state in the future is 
being called into question. Degradation of revenue streams adds to claims that the 
economy’s current composition is structurally unsustainable. Complicating this dire 
outlook is that the problem stems from both within and outside the country. 
a. Domestic Energy Consumption 
Rising domestic oil consumption is impacting state revenues and ultimately 
capacity. Current demand uses one-third of all production, leaving the remaining two-
thirds to supply 80 percent of the government’s revenues.279 Ulrichsen notes that the 
resulting opportunity cost of lost exports that turn into cheap, subsidized domestic oil is 
approximately $70 billion annually. 
Another paradox is that the bureaucracy needs significant sums of money to 
finance reform projects, yet low oil prices are what prompts reform. Thus, higher prices 
are needed to point to provide the resources required to implement change, yet affluence 
removes the sense of urgency that low prices introduce into society. The challenge is 
determining the equilibrium point between these competing forces. 
b. Changing Energy Market 
Saudi Arabia’s status as the international crude market’s swing producer stems 
from its ability to extract and produce at lower cost than other leading competitors; 
however, Saudi production operated at near full capacity until OPEC production cuts in 
December 2016.280 New low-cost production, particularly from shale producers in North 
America, prompted the International Energy Agency (IEA) to forecast that the United 
States will surpass Saudi crude production by 2020.281 
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The type and quantities of energy that the global market demands are changing. 
Saudi crude faces intensifying international competition simultaneously with decreasing 
demand from established customers due to climate change policy implementation, (e.g., 
the Paris climate agreement).282 Recent oil deals signed with China highlight the need for 
the kingdom’s primary product, but also speak to the future since they include a nuclear 
energy component.283 however, the market structure of the past four decades is evolving. 
Can Saudi Arabia do the same? 
E. SUMMARY 
Most of the kingdom’s problems are structural. The changes that need to occur 
require fundamental shifts to move the bulk of the state’s revenues away from oil sales, to 
make individual firms the driver of the economy, and to make Saudi citizens view the 
private sector as the optimum location to employ their talents. Structural change in just 
over a decade in a country with so many integrated economic and political restraints 
would be a significant achievement. 
Government labor policies are essentially creating a reform trilemma, where 
Saudization, privatization, and diversification efforts are struggling to coexist. The 
problem is that all three aspects are needed to make the economy sustainable. The 
inference therefore is that the bureaucracy must redirect labor policy to make Saudi 
workers, particularly women and young people, more attractive to employers. Forcing 
quotas onto management has achieved little success thus far in reducing unemployment 
and will slow the transition of productive activity away from SOEs. 
Top down Saudization programs that seek to create desperately needed private 
sector jobs to reduce unemployment among national citizens, particularly young people, 
ironically impede the privatization efforts that the government has simultaneously 
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worked to implement. The costs of hiring Saudi citizens is high enough that some 
businesses choose to follow market conditions instead of national priorities, resulting in 
relocation of operations to neighboring countries where labor remains affordable.284 
Governance improvements are necessary to make the Saudi economy more 
sustainable.285 Funding reform programs carries a price tag of several billion dollars, so 
the bureaucracy needs to keep enough cash on hand, or generate it via the Aramco IPO, 
to see Vision 2030 through to completion. The political capital that MbS has placed 
behind the initiative and the ease of securing investors during 2016’s $17.5 billion bond 
issuance indicates that the government will have the necessary resources to do so. 
Nonetheless, the history of reform in the kingdom shows that economic policies tend to 
receive precedence over political changes. In the event that current accounts decline 
significantly and the leadership must prioritize funding of Vision 2030’s programs, 
efforts to raise the country’s low scores for voice and government effectiveness would 
likely lose funding before more prestigious diversification programs, (e.g., the Fiscal 
Balance Program). 
Saudi reliance on patronage to manage dissent is not in line with the needed 
governance improvements. Most of the GCC spent its way out of the Arab Spring, while 
Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, and other poorer republics resorted to repression to quell unrest. If 
Saudi oil revenues continue to decrease over the long-term as a result of lower prices, 
international competition, increased domestic consumption, etc., the state’s ability to 
weather another Arab Spring may steep to repressive action. This scenario represents 
worse governance, ultimately degrading the country’s quest for economic sustainability. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
A. VISION 2030 SO FAR 
Researchers at Harvard and Chatham House have been conducting interviews in 
KSA to get an idea as to what kind of start Vision 2030 is having. Given the plan’s 
aggressive timelines, which seek structural change in just over a decade, one would 
expect to find either strong enthusiasm to rise up to meet the challenge or a sense that 
what the government is asking of its employees and of society is too ambitious. Most 
citizens are still shaping their opinions based on a wide range of variables. 
Expectations for the economy’s performance were positive at the beginning of 
2017 following a difficult 2016.286 Nonetheless, oil prices have not bounced back and the 
IMF lowered its growth forecast for this year.287 Karen House finds that social reforms 
are gaining ground, while economic measures are struggling to integrate into the new 
normal.288 After the government announced Vision 2030 the Interior Ministry 
significantly curtailed the authorities of the notorious religious police, reducing their 
presence and stripping their ability to physically beat moral offenders.289 The 
government is delivering on its promises to supply state sponsored entertainment, while 
many women are adopting more casual dress in public. As expected, critics see the 
changes as moral decay, not progress.290 Nonetheless, social modifications are important 
to create confidence among the population that the government has the capability to 
execute the plan that it presented. 
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Popular support for Vision 2030 is the other critical aspect that can influence the 
plan’s outcome, and so far, society is somewhat divided in its opinion of whether to buy 
into the new dynamics of working and living in KSA.291 Some within the business 
community see the proposed changes as a threat to easy profits, while others view 
privatization positively, and a third group has adopted a wait and see attitude; 
nonetheless, Saudi citizens moved $300 billion out of the country over the past year.292 
While this is likely a sign of uncertainty, it runs counter to the government’s attempts to 
increase FDI. 
Part of the uncertainty stems from questions regarding potential changes to the 
relationship between the people and the state and the success of economic reform.293 The 
lack of previous success in transforming the economy is naturally a reason for people to 
question if the outcome will actually be different this time. Political outcomes are also 
hard to predict, and there is little indication so far if the monarchy will grant the people 
more political agency in order to stimulate private economic activity.294 
B. HYPOTHESES 
A useful way to analyze the hypotheses is by evaluating the outcome on economic 
and social reform if improvements took place in each area. The idea is essentially to 
determine if any of the hypotheses are false positives, (i.e., ascertaining if eliminating the 
oil curse or creating a more competitive economy will lead to economic reform 
improvements in other areas). If change does not occur after modifications to an 
independent variable, then the hypothesis at hand is correlatively linked but not a causal 
factor. A short review of the findings included throughout this paper will facilitate such a 
discussion in the final section. 
                                                 
 291 House, “Saudi Arabia in Transition,” 13. 
 292 Ibid., 13, 20. 
 293 Kinninmont, “Vision 2030 and Saudi Arabia’s Social Contract,” 17. 
 294 Ibid., 41. 
 89 
1. State & Society 
Patronage shapes the Saudi system in many ways, to include how the state 
functions and how KSA fits into rentier theory. Hertog’s assertion that the “Government 
bureaucracies are segmented, with parallel structures dominated by different members of 
the royal family,” indicates that improving governance will not be as simple as simply 
forcing top-down changes upon the bureaucracy.295 
The state also directly drives the economy via the primary SOEs. A few 
successful PPPs demonstrate that the government is able to relinquish partial control of 
these companies, but is unwilling to fully privatize. Policy makers must decide if the 
government can sacrifice political ownership in order to generate a more market based 
economy. The NTP’s message that touts privatization comes across as slightly 
contradictory if the state does not lead by example with the companies that really matter. 
 Opposition to change is strongest among the portions of society that stand to lose 
out economically, politically, or socially to changes to the status quo. This reality is not 
surprising, but the scope of the changes that Vision 2030 seeks is so significant that the 
issue runs deeper than identifying winners and losers. Social liberalization is questioning 
Wahhabi authority as a source of legitimacy, which threatens clerical influence on 
education and public behavior. Popular support for MbS’ plan is a referendum on Saudi 
identity. 
2. Oil Curse 
The kingdom is ultimately better off having oil, as it enabled significant increases 
in the quality of life for citizens by raising human development indicators and providing 
higher incomes for portions of society. Oil wealth led to the construction of critical 
infrastructure and supported political stability in a region that has seen multiple civil wars 
and failed states; however, the country’s vast resources are not distributed equally, with 
many Saudis living in poverty or struggling to afford housing. 
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The state has come to depend on crude export revenues, indicating that several 
aspects of the oil curse exist in the country. The most significant outcome is the history of 
volatile and underperforming growth. Governance problems are the primary cause that 
makes oil abundance become a curse. Reforms do not occur in isolation, so governance 
stasis will negate overall reform. Comparative advantage is the primary limit to 
expanding agriculture, although Dutch disease has impacted manufacturing. Continuation 
of the existing model will make transitioning to a manufacturing economy difficult, while 
moving to a knowledge economy is currently out of reach. 
3. Market Inefficiencies 
MbS is pushing for structural change over the course of a decade, which is a very 
significant and difficult goal to achieve. The government has implemented several 
policies designed to regulate job creation for citizens in the private sector. Besides having 
little impact, these efforts more importantly created problems for privatization goals. The 
government cannot force its people into the private workforce, so it needs to promote the 
private sector as the most attractive place for its citizens to work. 
Stage theory shows that improved governance and revised policies are needed to 
move the economy to the next phase of production. Since the state manages the education 
system, it should continue its efforts to equip graduates with the necessary human capital 
skills necessary to increase the economy’s competitiveness. These performance indicators 
do not currently impede economic reform, since governance limitations are holding back 
economic change; however, if government policies do change, then Saudi companies and 
employees will need to be able to compete internationally as manufacturing increases in 
the overall composition of Saudi GDP. 
C. IMPLICATIONS 
The weak record of economic reform is ultimately a political problem. Politics 
connects all the hypotheses presented in this paper. Although economic and social change 
is the focus of KSA’s reform efforts, policy modifications in these areas will not be as 
profound and impactful compared to political liberalization. Improving governance and 
reducing patronage are the most significant actions that the government can take to 
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achieve its economic and social goals. The political system shapes the structure of the 
state and the relationship between the people and the government. Removing the causes 
of the oil curse is a matter of improving governance. Economic policies can help 
ameliorate conditions, but only political choices and behaviors can end reliance on oil 
revenues. The competitiveness of Saudi firms and workers depends in large part on the 
state relinquishing control of the economy to foster an environment that supports 
businesses, but also spurs them to independence by removing rentier incentives. Evading 
political reform is no longer in the best interest of the al Saud family or of the state that it 
rules. 
1. Political Problems 
The dominant role that patronage plays in the Saudi system shapes political 
behavior and alliances, influences economic decisions, and restricts the leadership’s 
maneuverability to change the status quo. Hertog outlines the core problem that 
patronage creates for reform: “Rent distribution means incurring obligations, even if 
individualized, and those can reduce a regime’s leeway to change institutions over time. 
This is perhaps the most striking feature of state autonomy in Saudi Arabia as rentier 
state: oil money initially gave its elites vast autonomy to create and reshape institutions. 
This autonomy however, has declined precipitously.”296 MbS faces an uphill battle in 
reducing the role of the state in society and in the economy since the existing structure 
regulates the actual degree of autonomy with which the state can operate.  
The country’s political dynamics begin a chain that intertwines all of the 
hypotheses and underpins the decades long record of weak economic reform. Patronage 
shapes the state’s structure, which in turn leads to governance shortfalls. This 
shortcoming leads to the aspects of the oil curse that are present in KSA, which in turn 
produce economic consequences that manifest in the labor market and the structure of the 
economy. These outcomes create conditions where the country’s population, businesses, 
and means of production rely on the state, bringing the process full circle and ultimately 
creating cycles that reforms have difficulty breaking. 
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The government must decide how much of a mixed economy it truly desires. The 
kingdom has several of the world’s most professional SOEs, and it can maintain 
sufficient political control over the economy and move away from oil revenues by 
diversifying these companies’ activities. If the state is unwilling to cede its grasp on the 
factors of production, the private sector will not become the main engine of economic 
growth and the primary employer of citizens. To achieve many of the NTP’s targets, the 
state needs to reduce its efforts in driving the economy and shift focus to enabling 
growth. 
Creating an environment that supports private economic growth requires a 
corresponding social safety net. Entrepreneurs will take more risks if the state 
redistributes resources to support small businesses. Welfare programs need to target the 
poor and the growing number of youth who are minimally prepared to compete in the 
private sector against foreign labor. This is important for the state to manage expectations 
and unrest, in addition to taking care of its most vulnerable citizens. The state’s push to 
social liberalization is winning the support of many young people, so it is not surprising 
that Vision 2030’s social reforms are moving faster than its economic priorities. The state 
needs allow political change to accompany such social changes to maximize its return on 
investing in both social and economic liberalization. This does not imply that 
democratization is the next logical step, but increased tolerance for hearing the public’s 
voice will pay off, while the old model of punishing dissent is not viable with the path the 
state has chosen. 
2. Avoiding Political Reform 
The challenges to creating change are complex, but the monarchy historically did 
not face external pressure to modify the economy. Leaders enacted policies designed to 
diversify and privatize for the benefit of future generations, without an immediate reason 
to impose reform swiftly. The rentier governance model and the resultant social contract 
proved successful at creating stability, improving human development and infrastructure 
modernization, and making the elite very wealthy. While economic growth proved 
volatile and fell below the potential of the country’s natural resource abundance, the state 
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had the resources it needed to make life better for most citizens and to ensure the 
monarchy’s political dominance. Geopolitical alliances with the United States and the 
GCC removed foreign pressure to subject the economy to Washington Consensus 
policies, which in turn quieted foreign diplomatic calls for social change or human rights 
improvements. 
The desire of Middle Eastern elites to guard their authority translated into an 
almost active avoidance of political reform, and harboring this attitude has come at a cost. 
Cammett et al. argue that “The main culprit, then, for the weak performance of Arab 
economies could very well be the strategy of ‘economic reforms first, and political 
reforms later,’ which led to the rise of networks of privilege with myopic short-term 
interests that stifled competition and innovation.”297 Vision 2030 pays lip service to 
political change by stating that some governance improvements will be made. Hopefully 
such changes will occur; however, the proposals do not equal a significant move away 
from the established patterns of rule by which the al Saud have governed for 85 years. 
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